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Abstract 
Developed industrial economies have faced challenging transformations over the past 
decade, stemming from the increased global interdependence of economic systems and 
greater reliance on rapidly changing technology. Along with the reassessment of the 
bases of modern society came the realization that human knowledge and ability to learn 
have become a key asset for development and growth. As developed economies reform 
to adapt to this new reality, they are joined by post-communist countries facing added 
challenges of political and economic adjustments. This study looks at the paths open to 
the country that was among the last to enter this process in Europe. Serbia's current 
situation with respect to human capital is assessed and examined in light of the global 
processes taking place around it, and its unique challenges are presented. The 
conceptual approach of the study involves looking at Serbia's human resources in terms 
of their quality, quantity, and distribution between sectors of differing productivity. This is 
done through a survey of educational reforms, skilled emigration, and forces determining 
the allocation of human capital. The study shows that there is a need to adopt an 
integrated strategic vision of human development as a vital component for the success 
of the transition. It presents this goal as a conceivable reality. 
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PARTI. INTRODUCING THE TITLE 
IrenaCerovic IEPSMasters Thesis 
Human Capital and Economic Growth 
A simple definition of human capital is that it "refers to the productive capacities of 
human beings as income-producing agents in an economy" (Hornbeck and Slalamon, 
1991, p.3). In other words, human capital is the economic potential of individuals, which 
helps them achieve a better quality of life and generates certain benefits for the societies 
they live in. The latter benefits can, according to the Neo-Classical understanding of the 
relationship between the micro and macro realms of economic activity, be considered as 
only secondary since the maximization of individuals' utility is the essential engine of the 
economy, or they can be placed in a concrete context and analyzed accordingly. This 
paper looks at the relevance of the social returns to human capital for growth and 
development in the case of Serbia's transition economy. It examines several important 
areas that may contribute to these returns and looks at specific policies to improve them. 
Let us begin with a brief overview of the development of theorizing in the area of human 
capital. 
The concepts of human capital and knowledge were first formalized into an articulate 
economic theory in the early 1960's, with the works of Theodore Schultz (1902-1998) 
and Gary Becker (1930- ) . These two economists were the first to argue that resources 
spent on education and training should be treated as investments rather than 
consumption, as they yield returns in the future. These investments could then be 
gauged against their present value, leading to an ostensibly useful cost-benefit analysis. 
While the idea that that there is economic value in human knowledge and skill reaches 
to back Classical Political Economy and Adam Smith, there has obviously been a 
considerable delay in expressing this idea in a theory. Several explanations exist. 
First of all, there has been considerable disagreement in the first stages of the 
development of the idea. Whereas J. S. Mill and Marshall on one side considered that 
"acquired capacities" should be distinguished from the person of the human being, and 
that only the former should be treated as capital, on the other side Smith and Fisher 
believed that human beings themselves represent capital and that by investing in 
education, they are investing in themselves. (Baptiste, 2001). Second, it is often difficult 
to differentiate between investment and personal consumption, and this is very much the 
case concerning educational expense. J. M. Keynes, for instance, believed that 
education was mainly a household expenditure and therefore should not be treated as 
investment. The dominance of Keynesian economics through the 1930's and 40's thus 
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precluded the further formulation of a theory on human capital. Finally, it also took some 
time for western economies to get to the stage when such a theory emerged as 
important. According to Briggs, this only occurred with the post-World War II economic 
and technological boom that suddenly necessitated skilled labor on an unprecedented 
scale. (Briggs, 1987). 
Since then, human capital theory has become a widely accepted approach to education 
as well as overall policy towards human resources, on levels ranging from schools to 
f irms and to government. Along with "globalization", the phrase "knowledge economy" is 
among the terms most commonly used to describe today's dominant economic system. 
According to Ernst & Young, "more than 50 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in the major OECD economies is now based on the production and distribution of 
knowledge" and in the United States, "more than 60 per cent of workers are knowledge 
workers". (Ernst & Young, 1999). International development institutions such as the 
World Bank have also begun to place great emphasis on the importance of knowledge 
for economic development. Underpinned by several examples of economic boost that 
are probably related to investment in human capital, most prominently the Irish 
"economic miracle" of the 1990's, these developments gave rise to a number of works 
exploring the link between human capital and economic growth. However, atop 
exclamations that the 21st century is "the century of human capital", this crucial 
relationship remains controversial. 
In particular, while it may not be all that difficult to determine private returns on human 
capital investment such as education (indeed, Mincerian wage regressions1 have been 
noted and studied in various segments of labor economics), it can be much more difficult 
to do so with social returns. Firstly, there is the obvious difficulty of deciding upon the 
correct measure of human capital. While earlier studies usually focused on "flow" 
measures, primarily enrollment rates, most contemporary ones use a "stock" approach 
and take mean years of schooling as a proxy for total human capital. Quite apart from 
the problem of choosing which of the two general approaches yields more reliable 
results, there is then the second difficulty of accounting for the quality of the education 
and training received. In addition, most analyses must rely on data that make 
' Mincerian wage regression - the statistical relationship between market wages, education and 
experience, developed by Mincer in 1958. 
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comparat ive analysis across countries or regions and through different periods of time 
nearly impossible. 
One fairly stable conclusion, however, seems to be that the social returns to human 
capital vary widely across countries. In particular, it seems to be the case that the 
returns are somewhat higher in high-income countries than in low- or middle-income 
ones, which is a contradiction to the law of scarcity - one would expect a resource (in 
this case, knowledge) to have higher value and generate greater returns in environments 
where it is scarce, and yet this does not seem to hold for human capital. Several 
explanations are possible. 
For one, "threshold externalities" seem to exist in human capital, indicating that there 
may be a "critical mass" of human capital required for investment in it to yield a positive 
return. (Drazen, 1990). In other words, investment in education can only begin to pay 
off once a sufficient number of people have been educated. Alternatively (or 
additionally), poorer countries may face other, exogenous hurdles preventing higher 
returns on human capital. Once such commonly noted obstacle is technological 
deficiency - it is often argued that there can be no great benefit to modern training 
without modern technology to go along with it, and it would make sense for human 
capital to necessitate certain physical assets to which to apply its skill. In addition, the 
absence of such technology may lead to human capital being put into unproductive, 
socially wasteful, or rent-seeking activities, which may even have a negative effect on 
growth. Another commonly cited requirement for the beneficial effects of investment in 
human capital to materialize is the prior existence of the essential pre-requisites of 
capitalism - solid institutions protecting property rights, and access to capital markets. 
(Braguinsky, 2005). Finally, as we shall see later in this paper, it is possible that a 
certain social structure may lead to an allocation of human capital which is such that this 
form of capital is not utilized in the most efficient or socially productive way. 
In their 2003 paper, Mamuneas et al deal with several of these factors and build a model 
that examines the returns to human capital across countries, while allowing for non-
linearity and taking into account numerous relevant contributing forces. In particular, 
they account for technology changes, and deal with the impact of political and economic 
f reedom on the output elasticity of human capital2. With respect to economic freedoms, 
2 In other words, their impact on the extent to which human capital will have an effect on growth. 
9 
IrenaCerovic IEPSMasters Thesis 
they find significant results concerning the effects of trade orientation on the impact that 
knowledge has on growth. Their finding constitutes "to the best of our knowledge ... the 
first systematic empirical confirmation of the often cited proposition that greater exposure 
to international trade brings access to foreign technology that complements human 
capital and raises its marginal contribution to aggregate production." (Mamuneas et al, 
2003. p. 14.) In terms of political freedoms, however, the results are not nearly as 
strong. Following Rodrik, Mamuneas et al take participatory democracy as a meta-
institution facilitating all others from Rodrik's group (property rights, regulatory 
institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social insurance, 
institutions for conflict management), and use political and civic freedoms (according to 
the Freedom House index) for approximating it. They find no evidence that having more 
of these f reedoms improves factor productivity. As we are dealing with Serbia in this 
paper, w e will be looking at a country with a very poor record on both economic 
freedoms (mainly due to the international sanctions) and political liberties (over five 
decades of authoritarian rule), and we shall see that the latter was very important as 
well, which means that the lack of political freedom either had an indirect effect not 
captured by the study, or that it affected the stock, or quantity of human capital rather 
than its impact on growth. 
The main and most relevant conclusion of Mamuneas et al is that the social returns to 
human capital can be either higher or lower than the private returns. The former will be 
the case if more human capital leads to technological progress or to a reduction in 
counter-productive social variables such as crime or corruption, or at least to "more 
informed political decisions", while the latter will occur if education fails to improve 
productivity and only raises one's social status. In addition, they find that the social 
returns on human capital are highest in high-income economies (especially the Asian 
Tiger economies very open to international trade), while they are mostly zero (and in 
some cases even negative) in lower-income economies - leading to the conclusion that 
high-income countries face certain positive externalities not present in low-income ones. 
An important role here could be played by the quality of education in these countries 
relative to the lower-income ones. 
Within the European Union, the need to meet the challenge of the emerging knowledge-
based economy has been recognized, and numerous measures and initiatives dealing 
with employment in the EU exist. In other words, the challenge has become identifying 
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the particular kind of investment into knowledge that will yield positive social returns. 
The need to invest in human capital was particularly outlined in the White Book on 
Growth, Competi t iveness, and Employment (Delors, 1993) emphasizing four main areas 
of concern: entrepreneurship, employability, adaptability, and equal opportunities. In 
addition, active labor market policies and their coordination are essential within the EU, 
especially with respect to the free movement of labor, making this a community concern. 
Labor mobility is thus a question of great importance, whereby elimination of legal and 
administrative barriers, facilitation of language knowledge, cooperation in education 
policies, mutual recognition of qualifications, as well as a common approach immigration 
all become vital in achieving the Union's goals of improved economic performance and 
balanced regional development. 
This paper tackles most of these concerns and applies them to the context of Serbia, a 
country currently undergoing economic and political transformation and aspiring to EU 
membership in the future. 
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Introducing Serbia 
Serbia entered the transition process in October 2000, after the massive electoral victory 
for democrat ic forces ended the thirteen-year authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milosevic. 
Prior to that period, it was one of six republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), and through it enjoyed a very peculiar status in the Cold War world. 
As a communist one-party system, it was naturally linked and ideologically very close to 
the block of Eastern European countries controlled by the Soviet Union. On the other 
hand, its breed of socialism was home-grown under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito3, 
who severed all direct political and military links to the USSR already in 1948. The 
country went through the Cold War as officially unaligned with either side (it was the 
founder and only European member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations), and this 
status al lowed it the economic benefits of trade with both sides of the iron curtain, as 
well as generous direct assistance from the United States of America. In addition, 
Yugoslavia's economic system was considerably more market-oriented than that of other 
socialist countr ies - never a real command economy, many of its 'socially' owned 
companies actually produced profits, its agriculture was not collectivized, and the 
standard of living of its population was quite high. When in 1989 communism began to 
collapse across Eastern Europe, however, Yugoslavia found itself in an unsustainable 
situation. Whi le it might have been the socialist country that would have adapted to 
capitalism and democracy the easiest, it ended up starting the reform process last and in 
much poorer shape than most other post-communist countries had been in in 1989. 
Serbia thus has a mixed pre-transition legacy: part of it can be traced to the period of 
state social ism and is, on the one hand, burdened with problems fairly similar to the 
challenges that other post-communist countries faced4 and, on the other, keeps within it 
some elements of a market economy and a liberal political regime, which should 
presumably facilitate the transition. The other part of Serbia's pre-transition legacy 
3 An important figure in the Yugoslav fight against fascism, Tito emerged as the creator of post-
war Yugoslavia and ruled it almost single-handedly until his death in 1980. 
4 Such as the ownership structure, inefficient and obsolete production methods, out-of-date 
structure of the economy (focus on heavy industry), remnants of principles of economic autarchy, 
extremely strong trade unions, and other issues stemming from decades of forced wage equality. 
Reforms result in shocks caused by price liberalization, privatization, bank reform, opening up 
markets to foreign competition, lack of qualified staff, rising unemployment and inflation, and the 
emergence of previously unknown income inequality, all creating a large group of transition 
losers. 
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comes from the period between 1990 and 2000, and it is marked by conflict, 
international isolation, massive population movements, economic collapse, and overall 
societal decay. 
The former part of this legacy allows us a basis for comparative analysis - as members 
of the camp formerly known as Eastern Europe each followed vastly different paths 
along their way of restructuring and reform from essentially quite similar systems, there 
is a great body of material to draw from for formulating conclusions and analyzing 
various choices and mistakes. Having another former Yugoslav republic, Slovenia, 
aboard the block of countries that are today part of the European Union, is an additional 
aid to understanding the processes taking place along the transition from this particular 
type of social ism. On the other hand, the numerous problems stemming from the 
decade of conflict and isolation pose a considerably greater analytical challenge. In 
addition to the fact that these developments occurred much more recently and that the 
vast majority of their implications have yet to be enumerated, documented, and 
quantified, there is very little basis for reasonable comparison. The countries that were 
themselves involved in the conflict, such as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are both 
still grasping the impact it had had on their development, and the divergence stemming 
from the different shape and nature that the conflict had in each of them pose an 
additional chal lenge (referring to which of them experienced the most actual fighting on 
its territory, which of them met with resulting population exoduses or inflows, which of 
them faced the greatest changes in their political/administrative structure as a result of 
the conflict, and the very different dominant interpretations of their own role in the 
conflict). 
While no actual hostility took place on Serbian soil (with the exceptions of the guerilla 
war led in Kosovo in late 1998 and the first half of 1999, and the 1999 NATO air strikes 
that cannot really be classified as "fighting"), the war was acutely felt throughout the 
period. The most direct and visible consequences of the 1990's devastation were 
economic ones. Over the course of the decade, Serbia attained the following: the title of 
world champion in monthly inflation (January 1994: 3.13 x 108 % per month, over 60% 
per day, around 2% per hour), the highest nominal-value banknote ever printed 
(500,000,000,000 Yugoslav dinars), United Nations-imposed economic sanctions, and 
one of the biggest organized robberies in recent history - the state's debt to the 
population based on the citizens' old foreign currency savings accounts exceeded 7 
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billion deutsche marks. In addition, two banking pyramid schemes rose and fell in the 
form of Jugoscandic and Dafiment banks - the former taking off with around DEM 300 
million of the population's money and the latter with around DEM 1 billion - both of them 
owned by people very close to president Milosevic. (G17, 2000). 
The social breakdown that accompanied the economic collapse is more difficult to 
quantify, but its impact will be felt, at best, just as severely. One very concrete 
development is the huge population movement - Serbia and Montenegro is among the 
countries with the highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
Europe - a total of over 600,000 (according to the UNHCR, 377,000 and 262,000, 
respectively). Outward flows are harder to estimate, but they have certainly been just as 
remarkable (see Part III). Another aspect was a complete shift in the allocation of wealth 
and power and a complete mismatch between the socially and economically 'higher' 
classes - this status inconsistency in Serbia was quite far removed from the transition 
paradox described by Csepeli and Orkeny as the shift "from unjust equality to just 
inequality" (1992). While the bulk of the population was impoverished, a small group of 
people greatly capitalized - a class of nouveau riche was created, eager to show off the 
hold it had on all official sources of authority. With a tremendous rise in crime, the 
second half of the 90's saw the proliferation and consolidation of this class, which had by 
1999 fully established itself as economically superior, politically connected, and socially 
as the chief creator of norms and values. While a somewhat similar development took 
place in many other transition countries (and would seem to be a reasonably expectable 
side-effect of liberalization), in Serbia this was not merely a class of persons who 
profited by manipulating their social position in privatization processes (although such 
cases are, of course, present as well). It was a class heavily involved in wars and 
atrocities, some of them from deep within the hierarchy of police and military forces. 
This is a crucial element, since it not only legitimized this class as the elite in a time of 
conflict, but also made it much more difficult to dismantle, by raising the stakes they had 
in maintaining their status. 
The effect this has had on the dominant value system is multi-faceted and complex, but 
it certainly contributed to creating a general conviction that personal talent and effort do 
not pay off, that the truly clever and able people are the ones using manipulation and 
illegal activities for personal gain, and that whoever held a claim on substantial wealth 
could not have acquired it in an honest way. A key consequence of this kind of value 
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system is the reluctance to invest in personal improvement and the disbelief in the 
effect iveness of education and training. This view was officially encouraged by 
diminishing shares of GDP invested in education and the overall disregard of this sector 
by the authorities. 
When in 2001 a democratic government was formed, its scope for thorough reform was 
drastically limited by the consequences of the systematic social devastation of the 
country. Wi th a strong drive and high aims, the government quickly caused a panic in 
the segments of society that had come to consider themselves completely untouchable. 
A painfully clear message was the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Bintfic, the 
chief engine and main driving force of reform, on March 12th, 2003. While the result was 
clearly not what those who shot him had hoped for, the pace of change certainly 
decreased since then, and some of the formerly threatened groups had been restored to 
safety. 
With respect to the labor market, the effects of all of the mentioned developments are 
clearly visible. While employment in the country followed a steady increasing path from 
World War II to 1989, throughout the 1990's, labor in Serbia underwent shocks and 
disruptions similar to those facing other segments of the economy. Marked by a severe 
reduction in economic activity, this period also saw the lack of necessary economic 
reforms and structural adjustments, and the huge flows of people (in the form of the 
influx of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as the outflow of skilled 
workers) created a highly unstable labor supply, in terms of both volume and structure. 
Official labor market policies had the sole purpose of protecting those employed in state 
and public enterprises (who represented the bulk of the electoral pool and the main pillar 
of political support to the incumbent government), while at the same time the informal, or 
unofficial, labor market was growing ever so rapidly. (Stojic-Atanasov, 2003). 
Five full years into the transition, labor market reform in Serbia is still in its initial phases. 
Persistently high unemployment continues to be one of its main features - official 
estimates place it at around 30% (Stojic-Atanasov, 2003), but the real number is quite 
difficult to est imate and probably differs considerably from the official one. On the one 
hand, due to the size of the gray economy, many persons are officially registered as 
unemployed (in order to gain access to the social benefits attached) while they are in 
fact employed or self-employed; on the other hand, the number of persons officially 
treated as employed but who are in fact not economically productive at all (i.e. they are 
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employed only nominally in state-owned enterprises, who place them on long-term, often 
unpaid leaves of absence in order to avoid formally laying off workers) is considered to 
be high as well. The Labor Force Survey estimated unemployment in 2004 to be 18.5%. 
In terms of the structure of unemployment, the vast majority are secondary school 
graduates, while a total of 71,823, or 10.8% of the unemployed, have tertiary education 
(37,063 vocational, 33,248 undergraduate university degree, and 1513 graduate and 
postgraduate degrees). 
Another striking characteristic of the Serbian labor market is the slow decrease of 
employment in the state and public sectors, accompanied by an even smaller increase in 
employment in the private sector. In addition, the labor market continues to be marked 
by large technological surpluses (i.e. persons with outdated skills and qualifications), 
high participation of the gray economy, low labor mobility, and it is still affected by the 
large f lows of migrants in the 1990's. Flexible forms of labor are relatively rare. (Stojic-
Atanasov, 2003). 
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The Role of Education in the 21st Century 
The rise of the information age has made contemporary society different to any that 
came before it in many ways. In addition to eliminating distance through immensely 
enhancing communicat ion and increasing the pace of life, the reliance on technology 
and rapid technological change as a vital economic driving force has rendered growth 
dependent on education more than ever before. The increasing complexity of life and 
the specialized knowledge required to manipulate the technology behind much of our 
development have both placed a significant emphasis on education - more specifically, 
on adjusting our education so that it is better able to meet the needs of the emerging 
society where knowledge and skill become ever more important assets. 
In this f ramework, an important shift in the perceived and desired role of education in 
society occurred. Whereas previously the chief task of education was to facilitate social 
and intergenerational reproduction, it is now increasingly viewed as the vehicle for 
creating the human capital necessary for the productive development of society. 
Accordingly, the new approach to education meant that it was to become inclusive rather 
than selective - in other words, the emphasis should now be not on selecting the few 
that should attain the highest education and weeding out those for whom such 
qualif ications would be unnecessary, but on including as many people as possible into 
the system and pushing them through it as far as possible. 
This section of the paper deals with changes in education systems and their functions in 
the context of human capital on three levels - the broad European and global agenda; 
the agenda in transition economies, focusing on Central European countries; the agenda 
in Serbia and the challenges which it is confronted. 
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The European Agenda5 
One important consequence of the inclusive approach to education in terms of system 
design is a shift of emphasis away from higher education and towards early education, in 
order to include and retain as many persons as possible. This means considerably 
greater educat ion expenditures, as well as several important challenges. 
The first chal lenge posed by inclusive education is adapting the system to deal with 
diversity. Aiming for a 100% enrollment rate in primary education means including many 
children who were previously not considered a high educational priority - this applies 
primarily to children with various forms of disability, but in many cases also to other 
minority groups, such as children of immigrants, girls, or the Roma. The aim of getting 
the vast majority of children enrolled in primary schooling to continue their education all 
the way to university level means channeling a lot of energy into an early education that 
will prepare them for this, which in turn requires a system that will equally prepare 
children with different learning mechanisms, varied intellectual abilities, and vastly 
diverse backgrounds. In other words, modifying systems that have hitherto served to 
identify those who should continue onto the next level of education into systems that 
naturally take all pupils to that level. 
In order to find the best possible indicator of the successfulness of different education 
policies, one needs to first identify the ultimate goals that society needs education to 
fulfill. Wi th respect to developing human resources and building human capital, the 
information age has brought with it one key element that has demanded the reform of 
traditional education systems across Europe - uncertainty. The uncertainty in question 
here refers to the unpredictability of the skills one may need in the future, due to rapid 
technological changes. In this context, it would make little sense to teach highly 
specialized knowledge that would become obsolete before one even completed one's 
schooling. Therefore, one of the key components of the new approach to education is to 
teach chi ldren and pupils certain abilities that will prepare them for grasping and 
managing new situations and unpredictable problems, rather than to transmit specific 
5 Due to the very rapid and multi-faceted development in this area, there are precious few 
integrated overview documents. Rather, this section is based on an extensive list of EU, OECD, 
and UNESCO documents, each of which deals with a different specific aspect of education 
development, and therefore they are not included as in-text references. The full list of relevant 
documents can be found in the bibliography. For the reader's information, the most useful and 
most comprehensive document for beginning a further survey on education is the Education 
Council's 2001 report The Future Concrete Objectives of Education and Training Systems. 
19 
IrenaCerovic IEPSMasters Thesis 
knowledge and particular skills. This challenge is made a little easier by the recent rapid 
development of psychology and pedagogy, which helped clear our understanding of how 
people think and react in different problem situations. In addition, a major aim of 
education is enabling students for continued learning throughout life, through both formal 
and informal channels. 
Taking this as a general guideline for what is expected of modern education in Europe, 
the most reliable tool for assessing education systems and policy requirements is the 
OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and analyses of its 
results. PISA tests are designed to measure precisely the general abilities and 
transferable skills that are necessary for finding one's way through modern society. With 
nearly 50 participating countries, it is an excellent guide to what are the policies that 
successfully achieve the set objectives. 
Two rounds of PISA tests have taken place so far - in 2000 and 2003 - and it will 
continue to take place every three years, with a tendency to attract a larger number of 
participating countries in each round. The tests are taken by 15-year-olds in their own 
schools, gauging their abilities in mathematics, reading, science, and problem solving. 
The tests are designed to create a basis for comparison between countries, but also 
along particular schools, socio-economic environments, and through time. Unlike the 
results of national and international competitions in specific areas, PISA measures 
cross-curricular skills and focuses on the application rather than the presentation of 
knowledge. In addition, PISA reports about student motivations, learning strategies, and 
their self-assessment. 
The results from both 2000 and 2003 do shed some light on the attainments of different 
education systems. In particular, as might be expected given that the tests are of a 
cross-curricular nature, the country results seem to be quite similar for the different 
areas tested, at least on the top and bottom extremes. For instance, Finland, Hong 
Kong, and Korea appear at the very top in all of the surveys, while Indonesia, Tunisia, 
and Mexico are usually on the bottom end. Serbia has only taken part in the 2003 
testing, and its students ranked among the bottom in each tested area. 
The geographical spread and the socio-cultural disparity between the countries falling 
into either of these groups are, perhaps, surprising. The OECD has published several 
comprehensive reports on the results of both testing terms, and has come up with 
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several clear conclusions. One of the most striking finding of PISA surveys, for instance, 
is that comprehensive education systems convincingly out-perform systems that involve 
student tracking. (OECD, 2005). This seems to be in line with the theoretical argument 
for an inclusive system - systems that group students without selection for an extended 
time (in Finland, comprehensive education lasts nine years) and postpone both 
specialization and stratification achieve outstanding results. 
Several sub-topics have also gained relevance in the global/European educational 
context. One of the most important ones is the already mentioned emphasis on lifelong 
learning. Due to the unpredictable nature of future demands on human resources, the 
formal education one receives needs to be such that it enables one for independently 
learning new skills in the future - the skills one will need within the future given 
technological framework. In addition, lifelong learning means that the education system 
is designed so that it allows transfers between fields and types of education on various 
levels, rather than closing down opportunities once a student has made a certain choice. 
This is particularly important when markets are such that an individual may want to 
change his or her profile several times over a lifetime. In this context, adult education 
becomes very important as it allows persons to add new skills or qualifications, or to 
update their knowledge in their own field. One thing that education systems must then 
do is allow and recognize various forms of informal education, by acknowledging 
certificates or granting particular programs recognition provided they fulfill certain quality 
standards. 
Another important topic is quality assurance in education. Once it is recognized what is 
meant by education quality (an education that promotes lifelong learning and supplies 
individuals with the skills and abilities to solve problems in unfamiliar situations), and 
once the standards for measuring it have been set (first and foremost, the PISA), the 
imperative of building a system that will produce such quality arises. The challenge is, of 
course, that such a system needs to be developed indirectly, rather than trough top-level 
directives and orders. It necessitates a complex system of evaluations and self-
evaluations of schools, students, and teachers, and then targeted policies and 
interventions in necessary areas. The results are only visible after a long period of time. 
The third big sub-topic in contemporary education debates is the role and position of 
teachers. The main concern here is the impact of the time lag between teachers and 
students - in essence, the labor force being created in today's schools will only fully take 
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part in economic activity in a decade or two, while the labor force that is working on its 
creation has received its education one or two decades ago. How do we prepare 
teachers today for building skills that will be required by the economy forty years from 
now? 
In essence, the role of teachers in the new education concept changes from merely 
transmitt ing knowledge to researching child development, contributing to the creation of 
the curriculum, and working on self-improvement and own professional development. 
The curriculum itself should no longer be just a set of facts and skills that students 
should master by the end of a given year of schooling, but a more flexible system that is 
partly created by the teachers and schools themselves. For quality standards to be 
maintained in this setting, the later achievements of students educated according to a 
certain curriculum are measured and assessed. 
A topic cutting across all different areas of debate in education is accountability. 
According to the elitist concept, education was considered a privilege and the existence 
of schools in the local community was a special advantage to it. Schools as institutions 
were therefore not commonly held accountable for the long-run development of their 
pupils. In a democratic concept of education, parents and the local community are 
treated as stakeholders of the system, whose interests are served by schools, which 
should in turn become accountable to them. In this framework, the question of the 
extent of education decentralization becomes an important one - on the one hand, a 
degree of decentralization is necessary to ensure accountability, but on the other, 
heavily decentral ized systems preclude the possibility of fixing potential problems from 
the center. 
The New European Dimension 
While education is not an area included in the EU domain of common policies, a definite 
"community paradigm of education policy" (Halasz, 2002) has existed for some time, as 
a necessary supplement to the harmonized, or at least more closely coordinated policies 
(e.g. employment). The coordination of policies external to education was ultimately 
what prompted closer attention to be paid to education itself, since it is the key tool in 
achieving many established EU goals, particularly in the field of employment. Thus, 
since the 2000 European Council in Lisbon, the paradigm was given a new and more 
formal life with the extension of the so-called "open method of coordination" (OMC) to 
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education, extended to the candidate (now member) countries in 2002. The key 
envisaged value of this approach is its facilitation of policy learning, while at the same 
t ime respecting treaty provisions that place education strictly into the national domain. 
Under OMC, education systems rather than policies are harmonized, with international 
comparisons putting pressure on countries to adopt some of the best practices that may 
emerge. (Halasz, 2003). 
The new EU member states from Central Europe bring with them their own experiences 
and expectat ions in this area, many of which might pull away from greater integration. 
As we explain below, education for these countries played a significant symbolic role in 
reasserting their national independence following the fall of communism, and they have 
already raised voices against the perceived "federalization" of Europe in other areas. 
However, the EU has also played a significant role in helping these countries' education 
reforms financially throughout the transition period, and the initial resistance is not likely 
to be a serious impediment since the EU is unlikely to move towards closer 
harmonization of education policies. A more important issue might be building the 
capacity of the new member countries for working with the new mechanisms of 
"democratic experimentalism"6. 
However, by far the most relevant educational area in the EU perspective concerns the 
transferability of higher education. The so-called Bologna Process is seen as leading to 
an ever-so-quickly emerging European Higher Education Area (EHEA), and already the 
1998 Sorbonne declaration recognized it "as a key way to promote citizens' mobility and 
employabil i ty and the Continent's overall development." In the 1999 Bologna 
Declaration, the 29 signatories outlined specific objectives that they pledged to achieve 
by 2010: 
• Adopt ion of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees 
• Adopt ion of a system essentially based on two main cycles, undergraduate and 
graduate 
• Establ ishment of a system of credits - such as in the ECTS7 system 
• Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free 
movement 
• Promot ion of European co-operation in quality assurance 
6 The political learning involved in the processes of democratic transition and European 
integration (Sabel, 2001) 
7 European Credit Transfer System 
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. Promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education 
The pledge was underpinned by the shared belief that "a Europe of Knowledge is now 
widely recognized as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an 
indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the European citizenship, capable of 
giving its citizens the necessary competencies to face the challenges of the new 
mil lennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common 
social and cultural space." 
Since the signing of the Declaration in 1999, many new interested countries joined the 
process (totaling 45 after the 2005 Bergen meeting), and the agenda itself expanded to 
include the promotion of lifelong learning, the involvement of higher education 
institutions and students, the promotion of the attractiveness of the EHEA (Prague 
Communique), as well as doctoral studies and the promotion of closer links between the 
EHEA and the ERA (European Research Area) in the building of the "Europe of 
Knowledge" (Berlin Communique). 
Let us now take a look at how these compare to the key developments in education in 
post-communist transition economies, and then in Serbia itself. 
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Education in Transition 
In a 2002 overview of the changes taking place in the education systems of post-
communist countries since 1989, Johanna Crighton described the current state of 
education in the region with these words: "The unchanging classroom has ... become a 
symbol of comfort and stability, presided over by middle-aged women tired of 'reform' 
without resources, who see their first duty not as innovation but to the safe-keeping of 
children, old-fashioned values like discipline and the unchanging 'correctness' of 
textbooks and timetables in a sea of chaotic change." (Crighton, 2002). Such a 
description draws a picture of Central European education that is indeed grim - one that 
implies that if any changes have taken place at all, they were only cosmetic and the 
essence of the system is still the same, the "unchanging classroom". 
Before one leaps to a strong criticism of education policy reforms in the region, however, 
it would do one good to be aware of the difference between the indicators pointing to the 
characteristics of education policy, and those depicting current education as such. 
(Halasz, 2003). Education policy not only necessitates an entirely different method of 
evaluation than, say, that used for assessing current education quality, but it is also a 
very long-term commitment that cannot be truthfully assessed by its immediate results.8 
Indeed, current education will almost never reflect the current education policy, except in 
cases where the latter has been stagnant for a long time. Nevertheless, we would still 
anticipate that, in transition, at least some changes ought to have taken place quite 
quickly, and that school atmosphere should certainly be among them - in other words, 
c lassrooms should by now be bustling workplaces striving to develop a culture of 
learning, and certainly not "symbol[s] of comfort and stability". 
In this section, we look at the developments in the education systems of Central 
European countries since 1989. W e examine the approach taken to reforming this 
fundamental sector, the typical circumstances surrounding the reform, the main stages 
of the process, the key areas undergoing change, as well as the impact of the changing 
international environment of education in the European context. We assess the 
challenges faced by countries of the region in tackling the field of education, and the 
main methods selected for dealing with them. 
8 In fact, Rado (2001) has suggested that in situations of reform, quality is likely to decline rather 
than improve in the first period of transition. 
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As we made clear in the previous section, education reform is certainly not peculiar to 
post-communist transition countries. Unlike political democratization, privatization of the 
economy, or nation-building, it is not an obvious area in which extensive and deep 
systemic change is on first sight necessary for successful transition and integration into 
the democratic capitalist world. However, already a brief second-order analysis clearly 
showed that an education system that would be able to successfully support the new 
economic and political order needed to be dramatically different from the one created to 
sustain a command economy, which itself had not adapted to the changes that have 
been taking place across the globe for several decades. It was also clear that this could 
not be achieved by a mere elimination of the ideological elements of the previous regime 
from the curricula or even by more far-reaching content changes if conducted on their 
own. What was necessary was a fundamental overhaul of the structure of the system of 
education provision and all of its components, including content, roles of key actors and 
stakeholders, management methods, and system of governance, beginning with a clear 
vision of the aims of education in the new democratic system. Most post-communist 
countries in Europe have taken serious steps towards thoroughly restructuring their 
education systems for meeting their new goals, and all of the new European Union 
member countries among them have come a long way along the path of education 
reform. 
In fact, reform of the education sector has turned out to be just as, if not more complex 
than reforms in other, more conspicuous elements of the new system. The reforms 
carried out in these countries bear very little similarity to education reforms conducted in 
the developed countries of the west, in terms of scope, extent, motivating forces, limiting 
factors, and the t imeframe in which they were conducted. Like the transition itself, 
education in transition finds itself most of the time in completely uncharted territory, in an 
uncertain political and social environment, and under high pressure to conduct 
fundamental changes with little strategic guidance and insufficient support from the 
overall system of governance. 
The External Environment of Education Reform 
Let us first look at the climate in which education reforms have commenced and 
developed in most of the countries in question. One of the first noticeable features is 
that, simultaneously with the grim view of education in the region illustrated by the 
quotation in the opening paragraph of this section, there is a surprising degree of 
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popular satisfaction with the system. While most other structural problems are generally 
recognized for what they are, education has continued to be a source of pride for many 
countries in the region. (Rado, 2002). The typical view is that the above-standard 
education or "brainpower" is the only comparative advantage these countries have vis-a-
vis the west. 
Such an image is the result of the different approach that most people in the region use 
to evaluate education effectiveness, which is reflected in quantitative rather than 
qualitative measures of education success (very roughly, the number of people that 
acquire an education and the number of years they spend in the system, rather than the 
practical value of the education they receive), as well as in a tendency to value factual 
and abstract knowledge over practical skills applicable in everyday life. Thus for many 
Central Europeans, the high enrolment and completion rates and the relative success of 
students from the region on international olimpyads (primarily in mathematics and 
science) are sufficient signs that their education systems are fulfilling their duty and that 
the only conceivable problem with them is insufficient funding. Many such convictions 
remained firmly in place even after the first international evaluations of the practical skills 
of 15-year-olds from the region (the 2000 PISA testing) showed disappointing results. 
These uncritical beliefs continue to pose a problem to policy-makers striving to improve 
the education and training systems in their respective countries. (Rado, 2002). 
In terms of the typical theoretical conceptualizations of education policy and reform in 
the region, Rado distinguishes between four general approaches: egalitarian, elitist, free 
market, and democratic, corresponding respectively to emphases on "the same for all", 
"quality for those who deserve it", "quality for those who can afford it", and "quality for 
all". (Rado, 2001, p.21). The common feature of these approaches (the importance of 
which varies across the region) is that their very diversity tends to work against 
accepting policy advice and recommendations from developed countries or institutions 
perceived as "western", since they are seen as threatening the national educational 
traditions. 
A key dif ference from education reforms in developed countries is not only the far-
reaching structural nature of the reforms in Central Europe, but also that reform moves 
which otherwise might logically follow one after another in a stable system, here needed 
to all be made at the same time. In addition, since the socio-economic system that 
education is supposed to serve was itself in the process of being created simultaneously 
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as educat ion was being changed to adapt to it, the education system has necessarily 
been shaped "in anticipation" and not only in response to its outside environment. This 
means that policy makers have often had to return to initial solutions and sometimes 
change them completely, to reflect developments in other sectors of society. 
Another problem peculiar to post-communist nations is the absence of a vision of overall 
human capital development of the nation, and indeed the absence of a history of 
strategic thinking in the isolated policy components that exist in its place. In ali of the 
countries in question, the social, labor, and education policies are fully independent of 
each other and appropriate regular communication channels between them have not 
been adequately set up. In addition, within these sectors, there is hardly any previous 
experience of strategic planning to draw on, since according to the socialist ideology 
these sectors were "unproductive", represented merely the "superstructure" to the 
economic base, and thus necessitated no systemic strategic approach to them. (Rado, 
2001). 
Due partly to this legacy, the main tone of the post-1989 education reforms was political 
and ideological, aiming to free education of political (party) control, to establish 
legitimacy in the system, and to build an education that is able to assist with the project 
of nation-building. These were the overriding tasks of the first stage of education reform 
in these countries, as we will see in the next sub-section. 
Finally, an immensely important disadvantage of undertaking education reform in the 
course and as a component of an overall socio-economic transformation is the absence 
of reliable information on the system of education and indeed of any established 
mechanism for transmitting the information that does exist through the system. Whereas 
the reforms that take place in education in the west usually stem from a long process of 
deconstruct ion that includes systematic research, evaluation, and information sharing 
(indeed, more serious reform is usually not even considered unless the information 
regularly gathered points to a problem in the existing system), in countries of Central 
Europe education reform takes place "in the dark", and laying the foundations for 
informed policy making is in fact one of its aims, as part of the overall process of 
transition. (Rado, 2001). 
However, we should also mention that the transition situation brings some benefits for 
education reformers as well. Firstly, the long stagnation in the field means that these 
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countries might now be able to skip several stages in building a modern education 
system, feeding on the experiences that other countries gained over many years of 
gradual reconstruction. Second, the 1989 revolution generated an immense amount of 
positive energy in the region, which meant both that public support for far-reaching 
changes was easier to ensure than it might have been the case had the system been in 
a more stable situation, and that many participants in education were keen to put their 
creativity to test, after having followed central orders for so long. (Rado, 2001). 
The Main Stages of Post-Communist Education Reform 
Three general stages of education reforms in Central Europe are usually identified. W e 
have already mentioned that in the immediate aftermath of the systemic change, there is 
likely to be great momentum but little resembling a strong vision - the education system 
typically fol lowed the changes taking place in other sectors, which initially had to do with 
the two key aspects of democratization and privatization. In education, this primarily 
meant wiping out all elements of communist ideology and eliminating the tight controls 
over the system, as well as the emergence of private education; some of these elements 
were codified in the new education laws that also characterized this first stage (typically 
occurring in the 1991-1993 period). (Rado, 2001). In addition, in line with the emphasis 
on national revival, there was also a strong trend present towards seeking out traditions 
from the pre-communist period and building them into the system (Crighton, 2002), as 
can be seen for instance in the emergence of numerous church-operated schools (Rado, 
2001). Another feature of the first stage of reform is the strongly felt participation of 
actors that are in some way external to the national education system, such as 
nongovernmental and international organizations. (Crighton, 2002). Finally, most 
countries commenced extensive decentralization efforts in this stage, as part of the 
democratizat ion drive. 
The second stage is where an actual comprehensive policy takes shape. Papers are 
written, strategies drafted, and proposals made, and the system gradually becomes 
more coherent. Finally, in the third stage, which some countries are already in, the 
solutions made are revisited, feedback is analyzed, and changes are made where 
necessary. (Rado, 2001). 
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The Key Areas of Education Policy in Transition 
Rado defines five key areas in which education reforms have taken place during the 
transition: (1) Decentralization and liberalization; (2) Education quality; (3) Ties between 
education and the labor market; (4) Education financing; (5) Equity. (Rado, 2001). Let 
us briefly look into each of them. 
As mentioned, decentralization was among the changes many countries initiated already 
in the earliest stages of reform; in certain ways, in these early stages decentralization 
may have been considered somewhat of a panacea for education issues and later 
needed to be more thoroughly worked out. The process essentially refers to introducing 
government sharing of responsibility with other actors to a greater extent (and not merely 
to changing the position within the system of government where decisions are made), 
and it was conducted by two principal routes. The first, termed the "democratic-political 
management system" (Rado, 2001, p. 66), emphasizes the political dimension and is 
based on the notion that educational decision-makers and decision-making bodies 
require legit imacy - thus they are typically selected on elections. A shortcoming of this 
approach, taken by Poland and Hungary, is that the bodies so elected often lack 
management capacity, particularly at lower levels. The second approach, the 
"administrative-professional management system" (Rado, 2001, p. 66) resolves this 
problem by making appointments on the basis of professional expertise, but suffers from 
a democrat ic deficit in governance. This is the approach adopted by the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia. 
Closely related to decentralization is what Rado calls liberalization, referring essentially 
to the inclusion of actors other than the state, namely markets and NGOs, and to 
widening the choice of the modes of education provision on offer through marketization. 
The second broad policy area is quality. We have already dealt with the perception of 
education quality that was common in these countries in the beginning of the transition in 
the first parts of this chapter. Here we can reiterate that the approach that worked well 
in a command economy and that focused on factual knowledge and allowed for little 
application of practical and problem-solving skills left very deep marks on student 
performance. The new concept of quality is very broad and differs significantly from the 
previous concept of a "high standard" education; this much is certainly true of other 
European countries as well. According to this new definition, quality means not better 
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average academic achievement, but rather "that students successfully acquire the key 
competencies needed for work and daily life, in addition to the desire and motivation to 
learn." (Halasz, 2002). 
In Central Europe, incorporating the new concept of quality into education policy means 
entirely changing the teaching environment and moving to a "differentiated classroom", 
characterized by flexibility, acknowledgement of differences, an individual approach to 
learning, ongoing and varied assessment, variety of methods and materials, 
responsiveness to student needs and interests, sensitivity to special needs, and an 
interactive approach. In addition to the necessary changes in pedagogical methodology, 
quality concerns in the region include adjusting education aims to the changing needs of 
society and the expectations of parents and children, making the student assessment 
system objective, reliable, and valid, as well as placing teachers in new roles and 
therefore reforming the system of their education and in-service training. Concerning 
teachers, the new vision includes the following key characteristics: expertise, 
pedagogical know-how, understanding of technology, organizational competence and 
collaboration, flexibility, mobility, and openness. Finally, the question of regulating the 
content of education, by means of curricula, standards, or assessment, and the extent of 
its possible and/or desirable decentralization, is a quality concern in its own right. 
(Rado, 2001). 
An area of equal importance as quality is the closer alignment of education to the labor 
markets in the region. One of the consequences of the rapid economic opening and 
transformation in these countries is that their education systems, which necessarily 
require a much longer time to transform, lag behind their new economic needs and 
gradually begin to hold back further development. This is due to the twofold effect of the 
economic transition, whereby the economy develops and needs an additional supply of 
skilled labor, and at the same time, education in itself gains economic value - with wage 
liberalization, the returns on education rose suddenly and dramatically. In the process of 
adjusting to the new labor market (characterized by more self-employment and part-time 
work, a growing share of small and medium enterprises, increasingly spreading 
information and communication technologies, and higher labor mobility), three aspects of 
the adjustment need to be dealt with. These are: (1) modernization, referring primarily to 
updating the content of education so as to better prepare students for work; (2) structural 
reform, referring to school structure and the different education types and levels (in our 
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region, mainly the problem of the rigid division between general, vocational, and 
technical secondary education, hindering the expansion of tertiary education); and (3) 
systemic reform, meaning primarily the different institutional and governance 
arrangements facilitating relations between education and employment (one important 
issue for systemic reform was already mentioned in this chapter - the need to better 
integrate the policy sectors of labor, economic development, and education, in order to 
generate a comprehensive approach to human capital development). (Grootings, 1995, 
quoted in Rado, 2001). 
Education f inancing is a permanent concern of education systems worldwide, and even 
more so in the former centrally planned economies of Central Europe, where the sector's 
inflows were reduced due to the general economic decline during the transition, although 
most governments strove to maintain education a priority. The difficulty is that the 
education systems in these countries are typically extremely inefficient, as they do not fit 
into the new economic structure and have no legacy of concerns over efficiency in the 
past. Other than searching for additional sources of funds for education, governments 
have the options to reform their systems of resource allocation (e.g. adopting a per-pupil 
f inancing formula) to make them more efficient, or to resort to policies designed to 
decrease costs. A difficulty with the latter is that it is likely to be quite tricky politically 
and that it requires a considerable initial investment in order to reap the benefits in the 
future. Finally, a key consideration is the cost-effectiveness of the education system (i.e. 
how does public investment into the system translate into learning, systemic, labor 
market, and social outcomes), which remains to be explored in the future, when more 
information is generated to aid its measurement. (Rado, 2001). 
Finally, the policy area in which probably the least progress took place is education 
equity. After f ive decades of living in a system that declared itself as first and foremost 
fair and equitable, education in the region today reflects both the hidden inequality that 
existed throughout the period of state socialism and the new and intensified differences 
in status based on financial condition, ethnicity, gender, and physical or mental 
condition. So far, countries of the region have dealt with equity issues almost solely 
through adopting structural reforms such as centralization, standardization, or tougher 
education input regulation. Most experiences of other countries indicate that such 
policies usually do not improve the situation, and may worsen it; instead, policies that 
tackle the roots rather than the results of poor equity are needed. Governments need to 
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build the capacity of their education systems to account for individual learning needs 
(e.g. children with disability) and to adapt to the needs of various groups in education 
(e.g. minorities, most notably the Roma). A whole range of issues remain to be dealt 
with in this area, from overall quality assurance, assessment and evaluation that would 
identify inequalities, handling regional disparities, and dealing with discrimination, to 
providing the condit ions for multicultural leaning, integrating students with special needs 
into regular education, providing financial assistance, and generally creating an inclusive 
system of education. (Rado, 2001). 
In this section, we showed some of the key aspects of education reform during transition 
- an endeavor both quantitatively and qualitatively different from the education reforms 
that often take place in developed countries. We saw that, while the initial conditions for 
reform may not have been altogether favorable (due mainly to the popular perceptions of 
education and the path dependency of various formal and informal institutions), there 
were also some early strengths of the education systems in Central Europe, as well as 
some benefits to be utilized. One of the key problems of education in the region, which 
persists to this day, is the lack of a comprehensive vision of human capital development: 
the policies that should be coordinated to jointly help build this unique form of capital in 
the region are instead typically fragmented and conducted in isolation from each other. 
Let us now look at the problems Serbia is facing more narrowly, while bearing in mind 
that the external environment of education reform in Serbia, and thus some of its main 
challenges, closely resembles that of the transition economies described at the 
beginning of this section. The actual developments within the system differ, however, 
and the fol lowing section presents the details of their implications. 
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Education Dilemmas in Serbia 
In dealing with education in Serbia, one must begin by returning to the basic distinction 
between the two approaches mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. One approach 
sees education as a vehicle for social and intergenerational reproduction, while the other 
assigns it a role in building the human resources of a country and so contributing to its 
economic development and social cohesion. One can safely say that, today, it is still 
unclear which of these two approaches is followed by the Serbian education system. 
Some of the problems of education in Serbia are shared by all former East European 
countries - the legacy of a long period of state monopoly over education; the low level of 
education investment; the heritage of numerous state-driven "reforms" (nominal, rather 
than systemic) the main effect of which is a general reluctance to reform and a 
perception of reforms in education as uncalled-for "experiments"; the neglect of the 
development function of education; the lack of student and teacher mobility; the legacy 
of curricula that are not applicable in practice and in life after schooling. However, as we 
shall see in this section, there are also a series of peculiarities and added challenges to 
reform in this country. Let us begin with a brief overview of the system and the 
background to its current state. 
Education System Overview 
The education sector in Serbia includes preschool, primary, secondary, and tertiary 
schooling, engaging 1.2 million children and youth and employing 120,000 - altogether 
directly involving nearly 20% of the total population9. The basic structure of the system 
is as follows: 
• Non-compulsory preschool education, attended by approximately 25% of pre-
school aged children10 
• Eight years compulsory primary education - children are enrolled in the year in 
which they turn seven years of age, and the system is comprehensive in terms of 
9 As elsewhere in this paper, the figures refer to Serbia without Kosovo. Montenegro, which 
together with Serbia forms the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, has a separate education 
system and no federal education authority exists. 
1 The 2003 Law on the Bases of the Education System planned for the introduction of 
compulsory preschool education as of 2007; the amendments to the law introduced by the new 
government in 2004 moved this forward to 2006 - however, since the preparations for this 
innovation are likely to require a substantial period of time, it is uncertain whether the government 
will be able to meet this self-imposed deadline. 
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ability, gender, and specialization. At the end of primary schooling, students 
pass an internal (school-developed) graduation exam ("matura") and only those 
wishing to pursue secondary education take entrance exams. There is no 
general external leaving examination. 
• Selection is first introduced upon enrolment into secondary education: based on 
their primary school grades and/or an entrance examination, students enroll into 
general secondary schools (gymnasiums) which last four years, or vocational 
schools which last either three or four years. In gymnasiums, students take a 
general graduation exam at the end, but again there is no integrated external 
leaving examination. 
• Tertiary education is split between academic higher education (universities) and 
vocational "further" education. The former lasts eight to ten semesters (with two 
semesters per academic year), and the latter four semesters. Enrollment into 
both is typically based on a combination of secondary school results and an 
entrance examination. 
• The private sector is not well developed. Excluding international schools, there 
are 6 private universities (each with several faculties), 4 independent faculties, 14 
post-secondary vocational schools (mainly sport management and beauty 
schools), 15 secondary schools, and one primary school. Private primary 
schools have only been legally allowed in 2003. (Kovacs et al, 2005). 
Concerning mobility within the system, around 90% of those who complete primary 
schooling enroll into secondary schools, and about 25% into tertiary education. The 
drop-out rates are quite high at all levels, however, especially at tertiary level, and at 
secondary especial ly among members of the Roma community, in rural areas, among 
children whose parents are of a lower socio-economic standing, and among girls. 
(Kovacs et al, 2005). 
The language of instruction is typically Serbian; however, in areas also inhabited by 
national and ethnic minorities, primary education must be fully provided in the language 
of the minority as well - this is the case with Hungarian, Albanian, Slovak, Romanian, 
Ruthenian, and Croatian languages; instruction of Bulgarian and Romany only as mother 
tongue subjects is optionally available. (MOES, 2002). 
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After this very general and brief overview of the structure of the system, we should 
explain that there are currently three forces that can be traced in current developments 
in education. First, there is still a very strong legacy of the system prior to 1990, since 
the basic structure outlined above has not been changed since that period. Second, the 
1990's saw a sharp decline in education investment and spending (more than 
proportionate to the contraction in the GDP), as well as strong centralization of the 
system, and both of these trends are still felt in education today. Finally, the post-2000 
period saw the introduction of first far-reaching systemic reforms in education, then their 
partial abol ishment and return to the 90's and 80's system in some areas following 
government change in 2004, and finally also some re-instatement of the reforms 
commenced in 2001, notably in the field of higher education. 
That the Serbian education system is in desperate need for reform needs no special 
explaining. As we have seen above, even the systems of far more market-responsive 
countries in Europe have undergone major reforms recently, or are still undergoing 
them, and the system in Serbia has been additionally devastated by the economic and 
social collapse of the 1990's. In addition, education in this country has the added task of 
supporting its journey through democratization and international integration - much more 
fundamentally so than, say, the European higher education reforms through the Bologna 
process. 
During the period of Slobodan Milosevic's rule, education suffered extreme cuts in 
financing. With the decline in the GDP and the influx of a large number of refugees, per 
pupil spending fell sharply - most notably in secondary education, where it shrank by 
57% between 1990 and 1999. This was reflected in the overall decline of education 
quality, and most conspicuously in teacher salaries, which in October 2000 amounted to 
roughly USD 1.00 per day (increasing to roughly USD 130 per month in the next year, 
and today amount ing to roughly EUR 250 per month). (MOES, 2002) 
In terms of education effectiveness, the signals sent from the first international tests in 
which Serbia participated (PISA and TIMSS11, both in 2003), simultaneously the first real 
evaluations of the outcomes of the education system, could not be any clearer. On 
PISA, Serbia ranked among the worst in all of the areas tested, indicating that its 
students did not possess the basic analytical or problem-solving skills. The TIMSS 
11 TIMSS - Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
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showed that students from Serbia possessed an above-average ability to absorb and 
memorize data, but were far below average in applying their knowledge to solve specific 
problems. 
Long before these results were made public, however, there have been clearly 
observable signs that the education system is not effective. One such indicator is the 
average length of university study - while most undergraduate programs last four years, 
students typically spend seven to eight years at university before graduating. (Kovacs et 
al, 2005). Wi th university education, a further problem is the inability to gauge the actual 
drop-out rate of each generation, since the number of graduates per year is not 
measured against the number of students enrolled in their generation. 
Primary and secondary education also lack a systemic monitoring of output. Prior to the 
reforms of 2001, absolutely no achievement indicators were even planned on being 
introduced, while it was well known that students typically relied on additional privately 
taken classes to provide the knowledge their schools required but failed to supply -
pointing to a system that is not only ineffective, but also highly inequitable, where 
student performance is closely tied to their parents' socio-economic status. It is 
estimated that around 30% of secondary school students use private tutoring, and about 
10% of primary school students. (Kovacs et al, 2005). 
Another vital component of the education system that was entirely neglected in the past 
is teacher education and training. Teachers receive very little preparation for their 
pedagogical roles in schools, since their initial training is based almost entirely on the 
study of academic disciplines - there is no professional education aimed specifically for 
teachers, except for teachers of the first four years of primary schooling. In addition, the 
in-service professional development system is such that teachers are not required to 
take part in it, and even when they do, its results are not adequately monitored. 
Unsurprisingly then, the role of teachers in schools is fully reduced to implementing (or 
rather transmitting) a centrally determined curriculum - there is no room left for teacher 
initiative or participative learning. (MOES, 2002) 
Finally, the Serbian education system suffers from a very poor physical infrastructure. 
While many schools were fully refurbished after 2001 with the help of the European 
Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), a large proportion still lack a library and very few have 
a proper ICT infrastructure (in 2001, one computer was present per 230 primary school 
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students and per 64 secondary school students; 20% of secondary schools had any 
form of internet access, and only a few had undisrupted access to it). Universities also 
lack adequate ICT, as well as laboratory equipment and libraries, but here there are 
significant dif ferences between faculties as some are better able to secure funds from 
outside sources than are others. (MOES, 2002). 
The Education System after 2001 
As the first democrat ic government took office in 2001, education reform was quickly set 
as one of the top priorities for the country's economic and social recovery. A team of 
experts, psychologists and pedagogues previously involved in various NGO's that 
fostered educat ion development and implemented numerous workshops and seminars 
to promote creative and participative approaches to learning, was gathered in the 
Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) with the task of developing an education 
system that would support the democratic development of the country. 
The new ministry set its goal as the "three Ds": decentralizing, democratizing, and 
depoliticizing the education system. The actual policies to be undertaken were outlined 
through lengthy public debates and a thorough discussion process with education 
stakeholders entitled the Roundtables on Reform (ROR). The ROR took place in 
October and November 2001 in 65 towns in Serbia, included 8,600 participants (among 
them parents, students, teachers, school principals, school psychologists and 
pedagogues, members of school boards and local community representatives) and 
concerned the key issues of education reform: school democratization, curriculum 
reform, teacher training and professional development, and evaluation. (MOES, 2002). 
Based on the results of these discussions, as well as on debates within professional 
circles dealing with education and experiences of other European countries, in 2002 the 
MOES came up with a key strategy document outlining the direction of the reform in 
detail, Quality Education for All - the Way to a Developed Society. On the basis of this 
and several other policy papers, a new Law on the Bases of the Education System was 
passed in parl iament in 2003. 
The key features of the new law included an extension of compulsory education to nine 
years, grouped into three three-year cycles each with its own aims and outcomes, a 
thorough curriculum reform that introduced elements that were to be developed by 
schools themselves, a new role for teachers within this decentralized system 
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accompanied by a well-developed mechanism for teacher licensing and advancement 
based on professional development, and the establishment of an Education Council and 
a series of centers that would carry on the professional work in education regardless of 
political developments (such as licensing, approving school curricula, and conducting 
school evaluations). In addition to the law itself, several supporting legal acts were 
adopted, including the National Core Curriculum for general education, the Specific 
Curriculum Framework for the first two years of primary education, the Guidebook for 
Teacher Professional Development, etc. In short, the effort that commenced in 2001 for 
the first t ime represented a serious attempt to frame Serbian education in accordance 
with global and European trends, following the approach to education as a key element 
in the building of human capital necessary for successful development. The publication 
Quality Education for All explains the role of education in creating human and social 
capital and presents a solid overview of human capital theory, as well as a clear idea of 
the direction in which the education reform should go if it is to meet the challenges of the 
global knowledge economy. In addition, the MOES demonstrated a willingness to 
improve educat ion equity and for the first time proposed measures dealing with special 
needs groups, including an affirmative action program for including Roma children into 
the formal educat ion system. 
The modern view of education also began to be expressed in other publications, not 
directly related to the MOES. One such example is the government's Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, which placed a strong emphasis on education as a means of investing into the 
future development of the country. In 2004, after early elections ended the term of the 
incumbent MOES, the leaving ministry team came up with another lengthy publication, 
Quality Education for All - Challenges to the Education Reform in Serbia. This paper 
was intended to explain the steps taken once again, and to clarify the path ahead to any 
new team that would hopefully continue with the reform along similar lines. 
The changes implemented in the 2001-2003 period met with surprisingly little resistance 
and the 2003 Law was passed with the support of all of the parties constituting the so-
called "democratic bloc" in Serbia (including the Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, which 
by then was an opposit ion party). However, with the government change in 2004, the 
education reform suddenly seemed to be among the first things the new government 
intended to halt. Indeed, one of its first steps was to pass amendments to the 2003 Law 
that reversed its essence and in fact reinstated some of the solutions from the 1990's 
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and 80's - the curriculum reform was abandoned, teacher professional development 
was excluded, primary education was returned to eight years, and the institutions 
established by the Law were all but officially disbanded. The new education minister 
came from the neo-conservative clerical wing of the DSS, and introduced these 
measures without any prior policy analysis, public debate, or professional assessment. 
Instead, minister Colic proudly exclaimed that from now on, the emphasis will again be 
on what children are learning rather than on how they are learning. Within a few 
months, the same minister attempted to abolish donor-financed teacher training 
seminars (explaining that she did not understand why teachers needed "communication 
seminars" at all), expounded on the negative influence of computers and the internet on 
child development, and finally eliminated Darwin's theory of evolution from the primary 
school curriculum (since it was "no more scientifically sound" than her own belief in 
Creationism). Although minister Colic was forced to resign after this, education reform 
was hardly cont inued with vigor. Political influences continued, and the new minister 
was assigned to the post in exchange for merging his party with the Prime Minister's 
DSS. Whi le the current approach is not the distinctly clerical insistence on going 
backwards in education solutions, it is far from understanding the full responsibility 
played by educat ion in social and economic development.12 Rather, the solutions 
offered are the ones that bring with them the most political points, and no radical cuts 
are proposed. 
The one quite progressive move was the adoption of the Higher Education Law in 2005, 
which, although essentially a watered-down version of the proposal drafted by the 
previous government, cleared the way for Serbia to join the Bologna process and start 
implementing the ECTS. 
However, the net effect of the recent developments in education has been the creation 
of a high degree of confusion and misunderstanding in the relevant public (among 
students, parents, teachers and other education professionals), as well as a diminished 
interest in educational issues on the part of the general public. The different, indeed 
conflicting effects of the three significant forces present in education create a highly 
unstable picture and one cannot say with certainty what the outcome will be. In addition, 
Serbia also suffers from the distorted public perception of education (like in other post-
12 
For instance, the new MOES education development strategy paper consists of three pages, 
listing the general major educational concerns in bullet-point format and offering no policy 
guidance or direction of any kind. 
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communist countries, many believe that the sole problem of education in their state is 
the lack of funds and low teacher salaries), as well as a common reluctance to 
modernizing reforms that may be seen as threatening the national identity. In the period 
of 2001-2003, this reluctance was only bridged by a very cautious and democratic 
approach of the Education Ministry, and in the future the trust of key stakeholders will be 
one more degree harder to obtain. 
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The Flight of Human Capital: Controversial Views 
The migration of highly qualified persons across country borders first received 
considerable public attention in the 1960's. Debates started on the "brain drain" from 
developing nations to more prosperous ones, chiefly in the form of south-north migration, 
and concern over the detrimental effects on the economies of sending states was widely 
expressed. Piyasiri Wickramasekara of the International Labor Office defines brain drain 
as "the permanent or long-term international emigration of skilled people who have been 
the subject of considerable education investment by their own societies" (2003). In 
addition to losing this investment into the education and training of human resources that 
end up elsewhere, such migration has the negative effect of depriving developing 
countries of a possibly scarce and very valuable asset - the knowledge and skill 
required for successful development. While skilled migration is hardly confined to the 
developing world, its effects are clearly more severe there than in, say, Canada. 
In fact, in today's knowledge-driven world, most migration is skilled migration. Many 
destination countr ies have introduced visa policies especially designed to attract 
professionals and highly education persons - Canada and Australia have long had a 
"point system" in place for immigrant visas, and many other countries, including the 
Czech Republic, are joining them. These systems assign a certain point value to several 
important variables to ensure that the most desired profile of immigrants will also be the 
ones most likely to arrive. The variables typically include age, marital status, language 
ability, educat ion level, years of professional experience, and occupation (with the 
occupations in short supply in the destination country carrying more points). In addition, 
migrating can be costly (in terms of direct pecuniary costs, as well as emotional, time, 
and opportunity costs) and from the point of view of source countries, those who are 
financially better off (and this usually means those with better jobs and higher 
educational achievement) will be most likely to leave. 
A second generat ion of brain drain debates was sparked in the 1990's with the 
increasingly global economic environment drawing with it large movements of skilled 
individuals, especial ly those versed in information and communication technologies 
(ICT). The context of these debates has been very different from that of the 1960's and 
70's, however. In addition to globalization and the "information revolution", the 
population movements of the past decade overlapped with the transition to market 
economy in a large part of the world, and they also frequently concerned temporary or 
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circular migration rather than permanent settlement. With this shift came the realization 
that several posit ive effects of such migration could be possible. It is this last element 
that gave rise to a growing body of literature dealing with "brain circulation" rather than 
"brain drain", and on policies that would facilitate a further shift away from the latter and 
towards the former. 
Namely, more and more studies mentioned the beneficial impact of remittances (money 
sent by family members residing abroad to their families in the home country), of return 
capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) on behalf of expatriates, of the 
positive contribution of an international education when graduates returned to their 
source countr ies after acquiring valuable training and experience elsewhere, and clearly 
a need emerged to reassess the common view that once a country lost some of its 
people to emigration, they were lost for good. 
This chapter will firstly introduce and evaluate the most oft-presented arguments 
concerning both the negative and the positive aspects of skilled migration as well as 
commonly suggested policies for managing them (this section), and secondly portray the 
situation in Serbia using available data and drawing conclusions on the applicability and 
usefulness of the various arguments for this country (next section). 
Arguments against skilled emigration 
The most straightforward way that outward flows of skilled persons can have a negative 
impact on their home countries is if they result in a shortage of expertise in certain vital 
areas of society. If, for instance, all qualified heart surgeons were to leave a given 
country, the resulting loss in human capital could be devastating. While this may not 
often be the case in practice, alarming ratios of highly qualified individuals have fled their 
homes in search of better employment opportunities abroad. For instance, 75% of all 
Jamaicans with higher education reside in the United States, while three-quarters of all 
African emigrants have tertiary education. In addition, those who leave are very often 
not only the most educated, but also the best educated (e.g. graduates of top schools) 
and the most qualif ied in other respects. This is often also the most innovative segment 
of the population, who would be creating jobs for their compatriots had they stayed in 
their countries of origin - adding an opportunity cost to the physical decrease in human 
capital. (The Economist, 2002a) 
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The fiscal loss of the educational investment into potential emigres is another direct cost 
of brain drain - its "fiscal externality" (Docquier and Rapoport, 2005). In many 
developing countr ies with net emigration, education is public and this cost is thus borne 
by the taxpayer. The budgetary loss is additionally exacerbated by the fact that skilled 
emigrants would have been among the highest wage-earners in their home countries 
(though they would be earning considerably less in relative terms) and as such would 
have been among the largest tax contributors. The shrinking of the tax base as a result 
of brain drain is particularly noteworthy in countries such as India, where the (emigrant) 
share of the populat ion comprising 0.1% of its population makes for 10% of its national 
income. (The Economist, 2002b) 
Indirectly, the diminished stock of human capital, especially of 'the cream of the crop', 
may result in a long-run lower growth rate and decreased productivity in the source 
country, as w e saw in the previous chapter. This "intergenerational externality" of brain 
drain is matched by an intragenerational o n e - t h e possibly lower wages and productivity 
of the unskil led labor remaining in the country, due to the loss of a complementary 
(skilled) labor force in the production process. (Docquier and Rapoport, 2005) 
The competi t ion for human capital across borders is also likely to increase wage 
differentials in countries of net emigration - if it wishes to retain its talent, a poor country 
will have to pay it a premium that makes for a considerably higher multiple of its average 
national wages than a wealthier country would. (Wickramasekara, 2003) Yet another 
possible undesirable effect of skilled emigration is a "technological externality" through 
which a country that loses a share of its intellectual capital lowers its chances of 
attracting foreign direct investment and of fostering investment into research and 
development. (Docquier and Rapoport, 2005). 
Finally, the most tangible potential benefit of skilled migration - remittances sent back to 
the host country - is not such a clear gain either. For one thing, it is not entirely sure 
that they can ever compensate for the losses incurred by losing the most capable 
fraction of the population, which is also the highest net-contributor in taxes. One of the 
few studies dealing with the question in fact concluded that they could not - not only do 
remittances tend to decline over time, they also generally stem more from unskilled 
migrants, who less frequently take their families along and who find integration into the 
host country more difficult and longer. Another study even found certain negative effects 
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of remittances to Turkey, most conspicuously the resulting overvalued currency and the 
inflation of the prices of land. (The Economist, 2002a). 
The presented arguments are merely the most common ones, but they are sufficient to 
show that genuine concern over the effects of brain drain on sending economies in the 
developing wor ld is not entirely unfounded. Let us now look at some of the cases in 
which the emigrat ion of intellectual capital leads to beneficial results. 
Arguments for skilled migration 
Most broadly speaking, it makes sense to think that the freedom to move to where 
employment opportunit ies and rewards for talent are more stimulating should not have 
negative effects. That the limitation of freedoms, especially ones that in a perfect world 
with perfectly eff icient markets would be pareto-improving of welfare, is simply counter-
intuitive to most mainstream economists today. Under this scenario, persons would 
emigrate from countries that have a large over-educated and under-employed labor 
force, and the move would be efficiency-improving. Yet, having enumerated so many 
negative externalit ies to brain drain above, more specific arguments in favor of skilled 
emigration are needed. 
A commonly cited one is that the promise of better employment opportunities through 
emigration may increase individual educational investment in potential sending 
countries. Then, as not all of the people who gain this additional education end up 
emigrating, the stock of human capital after emigration might actually be higher than if 
there is no such promise at all. The reasons why people who invest in education may 
not emigrate are many and varied, ranging from restrictive immigration policies of 
receiving countries to changes in individual motives, but some empirical evidence of 
higher educat ion levels resulting from investments being made under emigration 
uncertainty does exist. (Baine et al, 2002) 
Another possibility is for skilled emigration to actually increase, rather than decrease, the 
wage level in the sending country. With the top part of the skilled human capital gone, 
the remaining skil led labor will find its talent in high demand, and according to the logic 
of scarcity, this shortage should be accompanied by higher pay for the demanded skills. 
An argument already partly discussed above concerns the benefits of remittances sent 
home by emigres. Indeed, the IMF has estimated that developing countries get a total of 
about $100 bil l ion in remittances per year, which is considerably above any other form of 
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assistance they get. (IMF, 2005). The use that this money is put to is not always clear, 
but there are direct gains for the source countries if the recipients of remittances buy 
locally-produced goods with it. In addition, it is not uncommon for remittances to 
specifically be designated for development projects, such as improvements in the 
infrastructure of a local community being funded by groups of its members living abroad. 
(The Economist, 2002b). 
There is also a fairly clear benefit if former expatriates return to their home countries, 
bringing with them new technology, skills gained through additional education, training, 
or experience abroad, as well as new ideas and business opportunities. While they 
might still prefer to keep their savings abroad, being highly sensitive to local economic 
and political developments, there should be a sufficient technology spillover to make 
return migration attractive to sending countries. 
However, even if a country's human capital does not return permanently, there are more 
ways in which these skilled persons can, and often do, contribute to the economic 
development of their home countries. For one thing, they may constitute a trans-national 
community with considerable economic power that can be used to the betterment of 
conditions in their state of origin. (The Economist, 2002a). They may travel home 
frequently and keep strong ties, contributing to a brain "circulation" rather than "drain" -
investing directly, acting to promote trade between their source country and their host 
nations, indirectly transferring skills home through keeping in touch, or creating networks 
of expatriate professionals. All of these do occur in practice quite often, and this is 
perhaps the strongest argument that skilled emigration does not necessarily mean a 
brain drain - such claims essentially rest on the assumption that migrants sever nearly 
all ties to their home country once they decide to leave, and this is certainly not the case 
in the age of easy and cheap communication. 
The technology boost in India and China has been strongly supported, perhaps even 
initiated by these countries' expatriates living and working in the United States. In 
addition, professional emigrants from many parts of the world network among each other 
and so participate in the scientific and economic life of their home country - examples 
include the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), the Thai Reverse Brain 
Drain project, the Global Korean Network, and many others made easier by the 
widespread availability of the Internet. These kinds of "scientific diasporas" can play a 
very important role in the development of source countries. (Wickramasekara, 2003). 
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Therefore, whi le it is far from clear-cut that the emigration of skilled individuals has 
positive effects that outweigh the losses, there are certainly ways in which sending 
countries can attempt to reap the maximum benefit of their position, sometimes in 
cooperation with major host countries. The next sub-section presents some policies 
available to both. 
Viable policy opt ions 
Retention has for long been the sole focus and only pillar of attempts to combat brain 
drain from developing countries. Logical as it may seem, ultimately the only possibly 
effective way to do this (short of placing direct restrictions on the fundamental right to 
free movement, through, for instance, exit visas or special permits) is to eliminate the 
cause of skil led emigration and make the country an attractive place for employment. 
However, the inadequate reward for talent in developing countries is precisely what is 
driving its highly skil led people out, and it is quite unlikely that countries can deliberately 
change this over a reasonable period of time. There are other possible policy 
responses, and the ILO has identified six of them, grouped into "the 6 R's": return of 
migrants to their source country; restriction of international mobility to own nationals and 
foreign workers; recruitment of international migrants; reparation for loss of human 
capital; resourcing expatriates; retention through education sector policies and through 
economic development. (Lowell and Findlay, 2002; quoted in Wickramasekara, 2003). 
As stated before, retention is usually not the most feasible policy, and the same is 
probably true for return - several studies show that it "appears relatively limited" and "is 
often more a consequence than a trigger of growth". (Docquier and Rapoport, 2005) 
In addition, the benefits to a source country from return migration depend on several 
factors, and are not always equally desirable. Depending on the motives of returnees 
(according to Cerase, these can be failure, conservatism, retirement, or innovation)13, 
the time pattern of the returns (whether they are permanent or not, and if not, how often 
and under what condit ions they occur), the timing of returns (how much time returnees 
spend abroad before the return, which influences the extent of the potential human 
capital contribution to the source country), and their nature (whether returnees come 
back of their own free will or not). (Wickramasekara, 2003). There are also two direct 
negative consequences of return migration. First, it reduces the flow of remittances, and 
13 Cerase, 1974. Quoted in Wickramasekara. 2003 
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it would then be necessary to calculate the trade-offs in order to determine the relative 
benefits of return more precisely. Second, it "closes the migration cycle" 
(Wickramasekara, 2003) - when persons return to their country of origin, they no longer 
act as beacons for new emigrants, and thereby shut off the potential benefits of skilled 
emigration. 
The most common overall conclusion of recent literature on skilled migration, therefore, 
is that it is probably best to forge policies that target circular migration, or "brain 
circulation", as the solution that could utilize its benefits while minimizing its costs. 
Through brain circulation, entrepreneurs, scientists, and other highly skilled persons use 
their knowledge for their countries' economic betterment and as such are not a complete 
loss to them (indeed, in cases of highly innovative and effective diasporas or other forms 
of international communit ies, they could be a very valuable asset) and yet are able to 
exercise their choice and enjoy the best return on their talent. Policies such as dual 
citizenship or direct programs like the United nations development program's TOKTEN 
(Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) help foster this goal; other 
suggested routes for action both by sending and receiving states are listed in the table 
reprinted below. 
Do's 
S e n d i n g c o u n t r i e s Receiv ing countr ies 
• Incentives to remain and return 
• Promote linkages with nationals abroad: 
promote diaspora networks 
• Promote short term movements of 
professionals using GATS Mode 4 and 
other means14 
• Attain fast growth and diversified economy 
• Targeted investments in human capital to 
compensate for losses experienced 
• Dual citizenship and diaspora recognition 
arrangements 
• Greater emphasis on R&D and creation of 
centers of excellence with support from 
receiving countries 
• A brain-circulation friendly visa regime 
• Promote networking with home countries 
and support diaspora for source country 
development 
• Reduce student fees especially from major 
source countries 
• Follow ethical recruitment practices and 
regulate recruitment companies 
• Honor and promote GATS commitments 
• Encourage temporary movements of 
qualified staff 
• Divert technical assistance to education 
and training fields 
• Support diaspora arrangements 
14 "Mode 4" refers to the part of the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) regulating 
the movement of workers abroad in order to provide sen/ices. 
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• Incentives to attract expatriate investments 
• Information about opportunities at home 
• Awareness-raising of nationals on the 
contribution of skilled migrants to the host 
country 
D o n ' t s 
• Excessive reliance on administrative 
controls 
• Suppress democratic and human rights 
. High taxation of returnees 
• Restrictive visa practices which discourage 
temporary departures or brain circulation 
• Brain waste through monopolistic practices 
of professional associations 
• Mass recruitment campaigns in at-risk 
countries 
Reprinted from: Wickramasekara, 2003 
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The Brain Drain from Serbia 
Following the above outline of major arguments and policies for handling skilled 
emigration, let us take a look at the situation in Serbia and gauge it from the perspective 
of the recommended options. 
The Background: Historical Emigration Waves 
Former Yugoslavia has a long history of migration, both external and internal. Its roots 
and causes are manifold, but as a rule economic reasons prevailed as both push and 
pull factors - on several occasions in the past century, an economic boom in the west 
actually coincided with a slump (or worse) in Yugoslavia. Over much of this period, 
however, Yugoslav emigration mainly followed the main European migration trends. An 
overview of the general "waves" of emigration in this context follows, based on the work 
of Vladimir Greciic. 
1. The stage of emigration culminating in the 19th century and ending after World 
War I was directed mainly at overseas destinations (the Americas and Australia). 
2. This t rend continues after World War II and into the 1950's - most of the roughly 
200,000 post-war Yugoslav emigrants had not left their country in an organized 
fashion and, finding themselves refugees in a devastated Europe, the majority 
moved elsewhere by the end of the decade. Major destinations included the 
United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand. 
3. The f low of Yugoslav migrants into Western Europe begins in the mid-60's and 
lasts until the economic crisis triggered by the 1973 Oil Shock. In this period, the 
number of emigrants from former Yugoslavia in Europe rises from about 40,000 
to 1,150,000. 
4. With the onset of economic difficulties, European countries introduce a set of 
restrictive migratory policies and the number of migrant workers from Yugoslavia 
decreases somewhat. At the same time, a repatriation effort takes place and 
about 30,000 Yugoslavs are returned to their country of origin per year between 
1973 and 1979. 
5. In the mid-80's, however, European countries are experiencing a technological 
and economic boom, while the conditions in Yugoslavia begin to worsen. 
Despite restrictive policies for immigrant workers, about 30,000 Yugoslavs, this 
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t ime mainly skilled workers, are employed in Western Europe per year during the 
1980's. 
6. Finally, the 1990's bring about the collapse of Yugoslavia and the emigration 
wave f rom the 'rump' Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (today Serbia and 
Montenegro) reaches its peak. Highly skilled persons dominate the 
overwhelming tide of emigrants, culminating in 12,500 people leaving in 1993 
only to overseas countries. It is estimated that in this decade alone, around 
17,000 university-educated people left the country to the Americas, Australia, 
and New Zealand. The number climbs to about 30,000 if Europe and other 
dest inat ions are included. (Grecic, 2002). 
After this overview of the key emigration patterns, let us take a look at some of the main 
factors that contr ibuted to the exodus of the 1990's. 
1. The war in neighboring Bosnia and Croatia 
While there has been no direct armed conflict on the territory of Serbia proper, the war 
that took place in the neighboring republics and with the direct (albeit unofficial) 
participation of Serbia in it was a strong impetus for leaving the country. First, the 
obvious threat of mobil ization was a trigger to numerous young men to leave, made 
worse by the practice of compulsory military service.15 This practice did not only drive 
men out of the country - it prevented them from coming back once they had been 
officially recorded as draft dodgers. Many of these men have graduated from 
universities at home or abroad, and have sought to emigrate in order to avoid the costs 
of losing a year of their career to providing military service to a country whose 
government they did not consider legitimate. 
The conflict also acted as a powerful "push factor" for emigration through flaming up 
destructive national ism and creating seemingly unbridgeable cleavages between ethnic 
groups. This meant the flight of families that included an ethnic mix from among the 
warring parties ( intermarriage across religious and ethnic lines was not uncommon in 
former Yugoslavia), as well as of whole families of minority nationals (Hungarians, 
Slovaks, Romanians, etc.) who, although not directly involved in the outburst of ethnic 
15 Although the twelve-month compulsory military service did not immediately mean one would be 
sent to fight in the war, it was a threat present throughout the 1990's, even in the peaceful period 
of 1995-1998 (in that case, it referred to the possibility of being sent to serve in the Kosovo 
province, where conflict had been looming since the 1980's). 
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rage, found themselves in a seriously disadvantaged position, while they also had a 
mother land in which they could integrate fairly easily. 
2. Lack of democracy 
While Serbia also has a large 'traditional' emigration from the period immediately 
following Wor ld War II (comprising chiefly the descendants of persons who fought with 
the chetniks, on the opposite side of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia's internal conflict during 
World War II), the continued authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milosevic sent many former 
dissidents abroad. They had been hoping and planning for an end to their struggle, and 
were disappointed when the post-1989 society in Serbia had no role for them to play, 
and indeed did not differ much in its intolerance of opposition than the regime preceding 
it. With each year that Milosevic stayed in power in Serbia, increasing numbers of 
artists, writers, journalists, lawyers, and academics fled the country with resignation, 
The period of his rule having been politically much more turbulent than the communist 
era, rays of hope occasionally illuminated the otherwise generally silent intelligentsia, 
and each t ime they failed, a new wave left the country - many never to return.16 In 
addition, Milosevic's grasp on the free media and political opponents gradually tightened 
in time, and by the end of his rule he already verged on truly totalitarian rule. Each new 
drop of repression added a new reason for his political opponents to give up the struggle 
and look for better careers abroad. 
3. Economic col lapse 
By far the most significant driving force of emigration in general, and skilled migration in 
particular, is the condition of the economy and the opportunities available for rewarding 
talent. With the increase in inflation and the beginning of economic decline already in 
the 1980's, many who had the skills that were in demand elsewhere left Yugoslavia. 
16 Several such points of rising expectations followed by massive disappointment can be 
identified in this period. The first and probably least relevant were the first 'free' elections won by 
Milosevic in 1990. This was followed by large-scale anti-war demonstrations on March 9th, 1991, 
which ended with the jailing of the then main opposition leader Vuk Draskovic. Hopes flew high 
again when the Dayton agreement ended the war in Bosnia and settled the borders of Yugoslav 
successor states in 1995, which was accompanied by the lifting of sanctions and a rise in the 
living standard. The first ensuing chance for political change came in the winter of 1996-7, when 
hundreds of thousands of protesters stormed the streets of all major cities for three months, 
defending opposition victories on municipal elections - although these victories were ultimately 
ceded by Milosevic, the opposition coalition that had won them disintegrated within months. This 
period was followed by the war in Kosovo and the NATO air strikes, which in the end left 
Milosevic at a point of no return and resulting in his ultimate ousting in October 2000. 
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These included doctors, engineers, and other highly trained professionals. With the 
onset of economic sanctions, hyperinflation, and overall economic collapse, a 
fundamental uncertainty regarding the future state of the country's development and an 
individual's employment prospects in it set in. This was the period of the height of 
emigration, as virtually anyone with the means to leave did so, either temporarily or 
permanently. Of those who stayed, almost all of the highly skilled and talented 
expressed a desire or explicit plan to leave as soon as circumstances allowed them. 
4. International isolation 
A very important factor that should not be neglected here is in part related to all of the 
factors ment ioned above, yet it offered an additional element and impetus to emigrate. 
The FRY was under various forms of UN, EU, and American-imposed sanctions 
between 1991 and 2001, which have done more than express political disassociation 
from the Milosevic regime and harm the economy. 
The most direct effect of the sanctions was indeed economic - the financial isolation 
ended all official trade, and a fraction of the economic decline can be attributed to this 
(although it is immensely difficult to measure this fraction, given all other detrimental 
developments17). The harmful effects that a trade embargo can have on the effects of 
human capital on growth have been addressed in the first chapter. The sanctions also 
meant that remittances, estimated at some $100 million per month (Garfield, 2001), were 
either stopped or sent through less formal and unsafe channels. The financial isolation 
had the added effect of signaling an insecure investment environment, and, just as 
significantly, boost ing the gray economy. Sanctions left loopholes that allowed the 
skilled to manipulate them and smuggle foreign goods into the country. As the sanctions 
lasted longer, the number of firms allowed to trade was shrinking and they were 
increasingly l inked to the Milosevic government. Thus while virtually everyone engaged 
in some form of illegal activity during this period, the benefits thereof were severely 
unequal and certain groups close to Milosevic made their fortunes this way. (Garfield, 
17 Garfield (2001) mentions two surveys that attributed the economic decline to the following 
factors and in the following proportions: the study conducted by the G17 institute estimated that 
4% of it was attributable to the state break-up, 15% to UN sanctions, 4% to EU sanctions, 10% to 
hyperinflation, and 6% to the 1999 NATO bombing; the study conducted by the Center for Policy 
Studies assigned the contributions as 9% due to sanctions (UN, EU, and US), 12% due to 
hyperinflation, and 2% due to the bombing, (p. 28). 
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2001). This was also the birth of the so-called "import mafia", remnants of which are still 
present among lobby groups today. 
In terms of human capital, and quite irrespective of the question of the effectiveness of 
the sanctions, one key impact occurred in an area in which it was surely not intended. 
The cultural and intellectual isolation of the country during the sanctions was perhaps 
their most important long-term result. UN sanction between 1992 and 1994 included a 
suspension of scientif ic and cultural exchanges, a strict visa regime had been in place 
since 1992, and the rules for academic and intellectual isolation were ambiguous, 
leading to some institutions and organizations completely cutting off ties, while others (a 
stark minority) attempted to support opposition-minded intellectual development. 
However, the net result was that "professionals were barred from international travel, 
denied scientif ic information, cut off from international research funding, shunned by 
professional organizat ions and excluded from the international mail system. Many of the 
people most capable of responding to the country's humanitarian needs were thus 
limited and discouraged from acting" (Garfield, 2001, p. 12). Obviously, this provided a 
very direct impetus to leave - at least for those able to do so. 
Dealing with Emigrat ion in Serbia 
From the outl ine above, it should immediately be clear that the one thing Serbia does 
have is a large diaspora - some even estimate that of all ethnic Serbs, about one-third 
live abroad as emigres (Grecic, 2002). Even if the actual numbers are probably lower, 
this is still a large body that could potentially play an important role in the country's 
development. This is not new information to policy-makers - in fact, one of the key 
obstacles to a constructive development in relations with the diaspora is that it has 
already been used and abused numerous times in the past. Throughout the 1990's 
wars, far away f rom their home country and usually exposed to interpretations of the 
conflict through western media, some emigres turned to Milosevic and sent considerable 
amounts to 'assist the country's defense'. Needless to say, the government was quick to 
betray their trust and any funds sent as 'loans' were never to be seen again. 
With the beginning of the transition to democracy, the new government attempted to 
gain the support of the emigration and invited many to return. While there has been no 
serious study conducted on the response, some famous returnees may have served as 
inspiration to others - in Bindic's government, several key ministries were headed by 
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professionals who returned from emigration (Bozidar Belie was finance minister, Kori 
Udovicki was energy minister and later also briefly governor of the National Bank, and 
Dragan Domazet was minister of science and technology). The government formed in 
2004 establ ished a new ministry to deal with the question - the Ministry for Diaspora -
but their accompl ishments remain unclear so far. 
Some brain circulation efforts have also been initiated recently, such as the Brain Gain 
Program organized by Austria's World University Service (WUS) and aiming to attract 
emigre guest lecturers to teach courses in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. As they are very recent developments, we have yet to see the results of 
such initiatives, but they do indicate a desire to move in the right direction. 
Some steps have been taken by the Serbian government as well. Dual citizenship was 
introduced very early in the transition, and in 2005 the government passed a bill granting 
amnesty to young men who have evaded military service and spent years abroad in fear 
of being prosecuted if they returned. That such policies are only being enacted now is 
another indication of the extent of the problem - the flight of skilled persons was not only 
triggered by the severe crisis in the country but also tacitly supported by the Milosevic 
regime18, whose electoral base lay among the less educated segments of society. 
Although ult imately the only solid way to attract people back is through rapid economic 
growth and political stabilization, there is plenty of room for policies that reduce the 
damaging effects of skilled emigration and boost some of its benefits. In light of "brain 
circulation", one more open question is the still highly restrictive visa regime on the part 
primarily of the Schengen states. There has been some talk recently of facilitating the 
temporary movement of scientists and professionals through relaxing the visa 
requirements a little, but many of them will remain reluctant to travel for as long as any 
short-term visit v isas are in place, as the frustration related to obtaining them does not 
stem only f rom the administrative procedure in place (which may indeed be somewhat 
loosened), but also from the long waits and other related processes that many find 
degrading. 
18 Through, for instance, severely prosecuting those who fled to evade military service and 
simultaneously disallowing dual citizenship, meaning that many of these men were virtually forced 
to give up their Yugoslav nationality. In addition, the opinion of the regime of "brain exchange" or 
any similar effort was quite clear in the branding of anyone with ties abroad as "the fifth column" 
and such policies as, for example, a fee for exiting the country (a fairly small amount but payable 
every time one crossed the border; abolished immediately after the coming to power of 
democratic forces). 
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In conclusion, whi le the emigration of skilled persons is not an adverse development per 
s e , the c i rcumstances surrounding the phenomenon in Serbia were such that they 
typically accentuated its negative impacts and precluded many related benefits. The last 
decade of the 20 t h century created the economic, social, and political conditions for a 
long-term exodus of many, including whole families of minority groups, academic 
researchers, scientists, and politically democratic-minded persons. Since the main 
push/pull factors are economic, there are no clear signs yet that the outflow has stopped, 
but it should be expected to slow down as the pace of economic recovery improves. In 
addition, init iatives are now taking place to utilize the existence of a large diaspora and 
reap the benefits of brain circulation and exchange. The lifting of visa requirements for 
short visits to Schengen states would be a helpful step in this direction. 
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Approaches to Human Capital Allocation 
The previous two chapters dealt with the challenges posed by the insufficient or 
inadequate accumulat ion of human capital - insufficient in cases of severe brain drain, 
and inadequate in situations when the education system is not structured to be 
responsive to chal lenges of the post-modern era. We now adopt another, somewhat 
different take on the complex issue of human capital as a source of economic growth in 
a developing economy. 
The main quest ion in this chapter will not be how to build policies that will shape the 
mass of talent avai lable in a country into the most socially productive form, but rather on 
what this talent chooses to apply itself to, and under which conditions. It looks at the 
impact that a certain allocation of human capital can have on a country's development -
in other words, how the different occupational choices of talented and educated persons 
can affect its prospects. It is a difficult question to address since in practice countries 
usually face the problems of mis-accumulation (in the form of poor educational traditions 
and practices) and mis-allocation (in the form of talent being applied to adverse uses) at 
the same time, and the effects of these forces cannot be separated. It is presented here 
as an interesting and useful addition to the already described challenges of human 
capital, and as an aspect of it that adds an extra element of complexity. Namely, the 
majority of issues dealt with under this heading are not resolvable through well-targeted 
policies; rather, they largely depend on the cultural patterns and social relations of the 
population. In this framework, we will first look at the approaches taken to the problem 
of allocation in a more general context, and then return to Serbia and present data 
relevant to determining the factors behind the allocation of human capital in this country. 
Allocation of Human Capital in a General Context 
In his 2004 essay, Braguinsky cites the examples of post-war Japan and post-
communist Russia as two countries embarking on the transition to capitalism without any 
'institutional infrastructure' needed for the endeavor - neither country had a stable 
mechanism for protecting property rights, and neither had even nascent financial 
markets. Notwithstanding the length of time that has passed since the commencement 
of these two endeavors, one has clearly been far more successful than the other has, 
and Braguinsky makes a case for attributing this differential to human capital - not its 
accumulation, but its allocation. To do this, he begins by accepting a rather loose 
59 
Irena Cerovic IEPS Masters Thesis 
definition of human capital, which includes what he terms "relational capital", often also 
referred to as social as opposed to human capital. In other words, he adds the 
component of relat ions and ties between people as something that can add to the 
productive capacity of individuals.19 In essence, he shows that the form that this 
relational capital component takes in a given society determines whether that society will 
be able to use its human capital productively or not. He goes further to say that, if this is 
not the case, human capital may take a form that would be destructive to a country's 
development. This is a highly interesting proposition which, if true, may help explain the 
differences in the pace of development between transition economies. 
In the case of Japan, capitalism was built entirely by private entrepreneurial initiative in 
the face of bureaucrat ic inefficiency. Braguinsky (2005) uses the example of SONY, 
where the founder 's relationship with his father-in-law and the latter's reputation in 
Japanese society proved to be the critical factors for the success of the young company, 
to demonstrate how "relationship banking" successfully circumvented the obstacles 
posed by the lack of a stable institutional system. Personal relations and connections 
here worked to channel investment into a productive entrepreneurial venture that 
otherwise might have failed due to the absence of a formal institutional support 
mechanism. In other words, human capital was effectively used as collateral and was 
thus able to fuel growth on its own, and even contribute to the creation of a capital 
market and kick-start the development process. (Braguinsky, 2005). Hence, it would be 
possible for human and social capital to form the spark for growth. 
However, as the example of Russia shows, this cannot always be achieved. The 
country emerged f rom seventy years of socialism as an example par excellence of 
successful mass public education. The number of university graduates and the overall 
stock of human capital in 1989 were extremely high. (Braguinsky, 2005). Yet, fifteen 
years into the transit ion, the country is still not considered a competitive capitalist market 
economy - clearly, there were factors present that prevented a Japan-style scenario 
from occurring. The discussion of post-communist education systems earlier in this 
paper offers an explanat ion based on the extent to which the acquired human capital 
was adjusted to the needs of the modern economy. This is not the only possible 
interpretation, however - one of the contributing forces mentioned by Braguisnky is the 
19 Gary Becker, the founding father of Human Capital Theory, accepted this extension of the term 
as well - in an interview to Line Zine, he agreed that, in his opinion, social capital was a form of 
human capital. 
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massive brain-drain that occurred as the Iron Curtain fell; another is that the abundance 
of natural resources in Russia encouraged competition to be based upon rent-seeking 
and influence, rather than innovation. Most importantly, however, the socio-economic 
system of the Soviet Union was structured in such a way that it eventually shut off all 
access to property rights and legal protection to innovating entrepreneurs and created a 
closed oligarchic system. 
Unlike in Japan, where "reputational" capital played a key role, in post-Soviet Russia 
everything depended on one's political capital and connections. This was a clear legacy 
of the communist system, where an insider position in the political hierarchy was 
necessary to implement one's economic capital - in other words, bare financial wealth 
meant nothing (and was indeed quite unlikely) without a hold on some, at least low-
ranking political title. This peculiar kind of symbiosis between two normally separate 
sets of actors represented the most important asset for getting on in life, and ended up 
becoming the essent ial obstacle to an early development of capitalism. Under such 
conditions, privatization created what Braguisnky calls "windfall wealth", essentially 
sealing off control over financial resources and fully establishing a system where "insider 
trust" is the singe most valuable asset, which then clearly cannot be extended beyond 
the limits of the c losed circle or used as collateral for entrepreneurial development as in 
Japan. Finally, this kind of system is politically in equilibrium, resulting in a situation 
where relational capital has effectively hindered, rather than encouraged, the 
establishment of the conditions for capitalist development. 
Braguisnky's paper illustrates that, given a certain socio-economic legacy, a country can 
bring itself into the position that its economic elite, ostensibly the most productive 
segment of society, becomes a closed circle and discourages further entrepreneurial 
initiative. Murphy, Vishny, & Shleifer (1990) discuss the allocation of human capital on a 
more general level, also arguing that it has significant effects on the growth of an 
economy, more specifically claiming that it is the allocation of talented individuals 
between the (productive) entrepreneurial sector and the (non-productive and sometimes 
even counter-productive) rent-seeking sector that matters most, and looking at some 
specific factors behind their occupational choice. 
In their paper, they develop a model in which the growth of an economy is determined by 
the ability of its most able entrepreneur. The model rests on the assumptions that most 
talented people have general, rather than specific talents that can be applied in any area 
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or sector they choose. In a one-sector model, it is most lucrative for them to become 
entrepreneurs, and they are awarded by increasing returns to ability (i.e. they can earn 
profits that are higher by more than proportionate to their ability), and because they can 
spread this advantage by expanding. The latter is limited by diminishing returns to 
scale. There is a threshold level of ability above which people become entrepreneurs, 
which is constant in equilibrium, resulting in a constant rate of technology improvement 
and permanent growth (technology at each period is that of the past period improved by 
the ability of the most able entrepreneur), assuming that innovators do not capture future 
returns on their innovation. According to these key assumptions, the allocation of 
human capital will be "first-best" efficient in a one-sector model. (Murphy et al, 1990). 
Introducing a second sector (say, sector B) also introduces a very clear inefficiency - the 
socially most eff icient solution would be for the most able individual to enter one sector, 
and the second most able to enter the other. However, due to diminishing returns to 
scale, all of society's most able individuals will enter the sector where diminishing returns 
set in less rapidly (sector A), and as a result sector B will grow at a much lower rate 
(since the most able person in it will be significantly less able than the most able person 
in sector A). T h e inefficiency will be somewhat lower in case there are increasing 
returns to agglomerat ion of talent or if there is some comparative advantage to be 
gained from work ing in a particular sector. The two-sector model, however, still ignores 
the effect that compensat ion contracts have on human capital allocation (and this effect 
is indeed signif icant, especially with respect to the extent of the returns that are retained 
by talented individuals in each sector), as well as any distinction between entrepreneurs 
and management and the division of returns between them. In addition, any given 
allocation will change with preferences. The model does, however, stress the 
importance of alternative opportunities and the relative reward in different sectors. 
Finally, introducing a rent-seeking sector into the model yields the key conclusions of the 
paper. Defining "rents" as effective taxes on the profits of the productive sector and 
under the simpli fying assumptions of an exogenous tax rate, of rent-seeking being fully 
non-productive, of rents extorting a fraction of profits and no other income, and of rent-
seeking technology having increasing returns to ability and decreasing returns to scale, 
they now construct a three-sector model, in which individuals choose between 
entrepreneurship, employment, or engaging in rent seeking. In this case, since the most 
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talented will tend to have larger firms, the outcome will depend on the elasticity of the 
production funct ion with respect to the total ability of all workers. 
If the production funct ion for output is more elastic than for rent seeking, the most able 
individuals will jo in the productive sector and become entrepreneurs, those less able will 
become rent-seekers, and the least able will become workers. Here the growth rate 
remains constant and determined by the most able entrepreneur, but that rate is also the 
optimal one - s ince that entrepreneur is also the most able individual in the economy. 
However, the rent-seeking sector reduces the income level by attracting talent and 
reducing employment in the productive sector, as well as by engaging the less able in 
non-productive activities. 
In the case that the production function for rent seeking is more elastic with respect to 
human capital than that for output, the larger "firms" in the rent-seeking sector attract the 
most talented persons into it. In this case, since the ability of the most able entrepreneur 
is poorer and growth will be slower, since the added distortion of rent seeking is that that 
it drives the most talented out of the productive sector and into non-productive rent 
seeking. 
In terms of the reasons why so many talented people choose rent seeking versus 
entrepreneurship activities, Murphy et al cite three key factors: market size, firm size, 
and compensat ion contracts. The most able enter the sector where the "market" is 
larger (in the case of rent seeking, this refers either to a large official sector, such as the 
government or the army, or to substantial unofficial gains resulting from ill-defined 
property rights) and where "firms" are bigger (in entrepreneurship, this primarily means 
expansion opportunit ies due to few diminishing returns and accessible capital markets; 
in rent seeking, " large firms" refers to the discretionary powers given to rent seekers in 
gaining wealth). The term "compensation contracts" is used widely to describe the deal 
that talented individuals get as a return for their ability, and it is a vitally important 
determinant of the allocation of human capital in an economy. (Murphy et al, 1990). 
Firstly, the quest ion is how much of their income able people get to retain - in case of 
entrepreneurs, this share will be greater if taxes are lower, but also if all other forms of 
expropriation on the part of various official or unofficial rent-seekers are non-existent or 
very low - var ious fees, licenses, or bribes. In addition, well-defined property rights, 
especially with respect to patent protection, will draw more talent into entrepreneurship. 
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Facilitating the process of opening firms will have the same effect. On the other hand, 
an important determinant of the returns to ability promised by a sector is the ease with 
which talent is recognized and rewarded - occupations in which individual performance 
is clearly observable and where it can be compensated separately will naturally lure 
more talent, since the most able will find it easier to cash in their ability. However, 
individual output is frequently not the most observable in entrepreneurship and 
innovation, especial ly where teams of innovators are involved and even more so in 
economies where starting up own firms is a difficult and expensive project (resulting in 
innovators being employed by larger firms, where their individual output can be difficult 
to reward appropriately). On the other hand, if rent seeking is expanded to include some 
lees productive market activities (Murphy at al take the examples of law and financial 
speculation), very often individual achievement will be most clearly observable in that 
sector - indeed, one of the conclusions of the paper is that this is the most likely cause 
why these essent ial ly rent-seeking professions attract so much talent in countries like 
the United States. (Murphy et al, 1990). 
Interesting as their hypotheses are, however, the empirical findings are such that a 
conclusive and definite argument about the impact of the allocation of human capital on 
economic growth cannot be made. Using college enrollment into engineering and law 
majors as a proxy for the allocation of talent to innovation or rent seeking, respectively, 
as hypothesized, they find that the former has a strong positive effect on growth (both 
directly and indirectly), and that the latter has a direct negative effect on growth, but a 
negligible indirect effect (i.e., there is no negative effect of lawyers on investment), 
signaling that its main distortion may be drawing talent away from engineering. 
However, their sample also showed that countries with a large number of engineering 
enrollments had high investments in human and physical capital as well, indicating that 
the allocation of talent is not the only conceivable interpretation of the higher growth 
rates found for these countries. Rather, we would expect that these were also the 
countries that performed better in other areas as well, such as progressive education 
policies. 
This section of the paper drew attention to the possibility that human capital can affect 
growth not only through its accumulation but also through the way it is distributed across 
sectors, and outl ined some possible reasons for a given allocation to take place - from 
culture and social capital that may encourage or preclude an efficient allocation, to 
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market and firm size, diminishing returns, and compensation contracts. The next section 
applies this approach to Serbia. 
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The Allocation of Human Capital in Serbia 
If the authors above faced difficulties in coming to a measure of the allocation of human 
capital that could be considered, if not precise, at least a fairly solid proxy, such an 
endeavor would be near-impossible in Serbia. As the previous chapters explained, there 
is a serious dearth of data regarding many vital indicators in the field of human capital. 
Our best attempt, then, is to resort to crude measures such as university enrollments. 
An alternative possibil ity is to examine the circumstances that may lead to a likely 
allocation of human capital, and to leave out the estimation of the actual allocation, at 
least until the data available can be collected in a way that makes it slightly more 
reliable. 
This section will utilize both of these approaches. First, we shall look at the social and 
cultural capital in Serbia and analyze its likely impact on the distribution of talent. Then, 
we examine recent enrollment data for the various faculties at Belgrade University and 
attempt to draw a rough picture of the preferences they may indicate among the young 
and talented. 
Of the two ex t reme examples in Braguinsky's case study, one would reasonably expect 
Serbia to fall much closer to the Russian than the Japanese case. While this is probably 
true, and we are wi tnessing more and more evidence of a 'tycoonization' of the Serbian 
economy, here w e will treat it as an open question, an unfinished development, since 
Serbia is still in a fairly early stage of the transition process. Suffice it to say that the 
majority of those who gained immense wealth during the Milosevic regime are still left 
fairly intact, with the possible exception of those who were subject to the "extra-profit 
tax"20 levied in the initial period of the transition. Our task here will be to look at the 
consequences to the "social capital" and further development in Serbia of the past 
period, and the inf luence of present-day social and cultural values on the allocation of 
human capital and thus indirectly also economic development. 
This paper already touched upon the criminalization of Serbian society that took place in 
the 1990's due to the promotion of politically suitable "businessmen" and the deep social 
20 To the first democratic government formed in 2001, the extra-profit tax served as the only 
possible legal resort for taxing those who gained wealth through illegitimate but technically legal 
means during Milosevic's rule For instance, it included those who were able to manipulate the 
black currency market with the protection of the ruling elite (buying currency at official rates and 
selling it at the black market rate), various forms of abuse of official positions, etc. The post-2000 
government dealt with these and similar gains by estimating them and treating them as extra-
profit", retroactively subject to tax rates ranging from 30 to 90 percent. 
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crisis related to the armed conflict and international isolation. It is worth reiterating the 
impact that the systemic collapse has had on the social fabric - the rules of social 
support broke down, the lines between legal and illegal became unclear, the value of 
education depreciated, and young people were faced with criminals as models of 
success. This absolute muddling of values led to the country becoming a "community of 
individual survivors" (Garfield, 2001). We now look at the impact this has had on today's 
preferences and va lue positions. 
The Aspiration Survey conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
in July 2003 offers some valuable insight into the value orientations of the population. A 
significant d rawback for the purposes of this paper is that the Survey does not 
distinguish between "talent" and the rest of the population, except in cases when there 
are striking di f ferences in answers attributable to educational attainment - thus it does 
not present a completely accurate picture of the preferences of the highly skilled. 
The most relevant question for us is entrepreneurial capacity, or the willingness of 
talented individuals to invest their skill in innovation. The results are not promising. The 
share of the people potentially intending to start a private business is quite low, while by 
far the most preferred occupational choice is a "safe job in a state company". Only 14% 
of the respondents chose starting their own business as their first choice, and three-
quarters were completely disinterested. Of these, however, a certain number might be 
willing to engage in entrepreneurship, but do not consider it feasible - a total of one-fifth 
of the respondents stated that they "think about business" but do not think there is a 
chance for them to succeed in it. (UNDP, 2004). 
The most commonly cited reason why a private business was not considered a preferred 
occupational choice is the lack of financial means for start-up (26%). While this is 
probably the most common reason why people anywhere decide not to go into business, 
the problem may be quite far-reaching in Serbia. There is much talk of supporting small 
business and sel f -employment in the media, but in reality, the market for venture capital 
is non-existent, and there are virtually no funds available for start-up companies from 
any sources. The only options were several contests organized by the state Fund for 
Development and the Employment Office for loans of €5,000-€20,000 for start-up 
businesses under favorable conditions. However, the contests were only open to those 
officially registered as unemployed and the primary criterion for obtaining the funds was 
not the long-term sustainabil ity of the business but the number of workers that the new 
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firm would employ. In addition, applicants needed to supply the same level of security 
(guarantors, mortgage, etc.) that would be required for bank loans (although the latter 
are not offered to start-ups). Consumer loans from banks, as an alternative source of 
financing for small business, are still offered under quite unfavorable conditions and the 
interest rates are considerably higher than in neighboring countries. 
Now that w e addressed the main concern that people mention as an obstacle to 
entrepreneurship, w e should also take a look at the overall openness of the country's 
economic system to innovation and some less apparent costs of doing business. 
The World Bank's "Doing Business" report for 2005 states that, of the 155 countries 
studied each year, Serbia has achieved the greatest improvements in the investment 
climate in 2005. There is no reason to be overly optimistic, however - it is still ranked as 
number 92 of the 155 according to the overall ease of doing business. While in many 
areas the country ranks similar to or even better than the regional average, in those 
areas in which it does lag behind it is severely backward. These include dealing with 
licenses (rank 130), trading across borders (rank 123), enforcing contracts (rank 110), 
registering property (rank 103), and the already mentioned - getting credit (rank 99). 
(World Bank, 2005). A table summarizing the main findings is included in Annex 5. 
An additional hurdle in starting a business is the lack of transparency regarding 
procedures, often stemming from the poor training of the bureaucrats in charge of 
handling business affairs. While this problem was greatly eased with the centralization 
of registry procedures into one unified Business Registry Agency (previously split by 
municipality and handled by the already under-educated, over-burdened, and under-paid 
municipal officials), many bodies in charge of handling licenses or conducting various 
kinds of inspect ion remain non-transparent, creating information problems and 
increasing t ransact ion costs. 
Other than lack of capital, respondents to the Aspiration Survey did not cite many 
reasons for not enter ing business (although the questionnaire offered explanations such 
as the lack of security in private business, the extent of corruption). However, answers 
to other segments of the survey indicate that there may be certain value-related 
constraints involved as well. 
When asked about their desired society, the great majority of respondents opt for a 
market-based economic system with a strong state presence. Virtually none of them 
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chose a "socialist economy" as their preference, but the proportion of those claiming to 
support a "free market economy" or a "mixed economic model" was 42% and 43%, 
respectively. Even among business owners, "free market economy" was preferred only 
by 47%. (UNDP, 2004). 
The social democrat ic orientation emerged more clearly in questions concerning the role 
of the state in economic management (with 65% of the respondents in Serbia stating 
they would like to see this role strengthened) and the extent of social support (83% said 
they wanted it increased), as well as free healthcare (86% in favor) and stronger control 
over monopoly enterpr ises (94% in favor). Even more clear is the reluctance to an 
individualistic society, with the majority (69%) considering that the state should bear the 
primary responsibil i ty for individuals' destinies. (UNDP, 2004). 
Asked about the sector that they believe should play the leading role in the desired 
economic system, respondents showed equal support for the state and the private 
sectors (38% each), while 21% said that it should be "big international corporations". The 
proportions for respondents defined as belonging to the elite were 26% state, 47% 
private sector, and 26% big international corporations. While the relatively high 
proportion of respondents who would like multinationals to take the leading role in the 
economy may indicate a higher preference for the private sector, it is probably more 
likely that these companies are perceived as large employers and that their role as 
sources of job securi ty was more important. An interesting fact is that only 47% of 
business owners bel ieve that the private sector should take the "leading role" in the 
country's development . (UNDP, 2004). 
All of these, along with responses in certain other areas which also indicate a strong 
reliance on the state, point to a cultural pattern favoring security and solidarity over high 
return and compet i t iveness. While this can partly be interpreted as a legacy of the 
socialist period of egalitarian values, it may just as much be a reaction to the long period 
of chaos and instabil ity in the 1990's, as well as the first two years of the transition, in 
which many people lost their jobs in the newly privatized companies. In addition, 
entrepreneurs in Serbia have leaned over the past decades that virtually no serious 
business moves could be made without the blessing of the state, or its indirect consent, 
and thus cont inue to expect some kind of top-down substitute for initiative. Be as it may, 
if such preferences hold for the fraction of the population with the highest human capital 
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and potential to dr ive the economic transformation, they will most likely not use this 
potential in the way that would be most favorable for the country's development. 
Returning now to social capital, the Aspiration Survey does not reveal much - it states 
that "the populat ion of Serbia and Montenegro shows a moderate level of social and 
interpersonal trust" (p. 28), and presents data on the extent of social solidarity and 
tolerance. The quest ion important for us here, however, is whether the overall level of 
trust is low enough to encourage the formation of Russian-style closed groups of 
oligarchs, or whether the informal links between people are such that they will prevent 
the spread of corrupt ion and contribute to a positive development with respect to the 
allocation of human capital. 
While citizens of Serbia cite corruption as one of the most important problems in their 
country (according to some sources, it ranks fourth after poverty, unemployment, and 
crime (Sukovic, 2005)) and the vast majority state that they would refuse to be involved 
in it under any condit ions, actively (as bribe-givers) or passively (as receivers of 
bribes)21, the attent ion that anti-corruption measures receive in the public is 
disappointing. Hitherto measures usually referred to improving the legal and institutional 
framework, by passing new regulations and establishing bodies for combating 
corruption. However , while numerous laws have been passed (Law on the Conflict of 
Interest, Law on the Accessibil i ty of Public Information, Law on the Financing of Political 
Parties, to name a few), they are not always fully implemented. In addition, the 
institution establ ished for the purposes of the struggle against the phenomenon, the 
Council for Fighting Corruption, has come up with numerous reports on possible cases 
of corruption, but it has largely been ignored both by the prosecution and the general 
public. (Sukovic, 2005). 
Transparency Serbia, the local branch of the international organization monitoring and 
fighting corruption worldwide, has been measuring the subjective perception of the level 
of corruption. The index for Serbia and Montenegro in 2004 was 2.7 (on a scale of 0-10, 
with lower values indicating higher degrees of corruption) and earned it the rank of 97 
among 145 places22 (the same rank is shared by Algeria, Lebanon, Macedonia, and 
Nicaragua). (Transparency Serbia, 2005). The result represents an improvement from 
2] 54% and 72%, respectively (UNDP, 2004) 
More than 145 countr ies were surveyed, but many occupy the same rank 
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2003, when the country occupied position 89 out of 90, with a corruption index of 1.3. 
(Transparency Serbia, 2004). 
Although these are not objective measures of how much corruption actually takes place, 
and, as perceptions, would probably continue to be high for a while even after certain 
positive developments, the trend is a troubling one - especially combined with the 
overall apathy and lack of interest in anti-corruption measures.23 
The picture obta ined by combining the overall data above, as well as the dominant 
cultural pattern of heavy reliance on the state and insufficient individual initiative, would 
seem to be one in which we could expect a lot of talent to be misallocated into rent-
seeking and social ly unproductive activities. Let us now look into the enrollment data for 
Belgrade University over the past three years. 
The three facult ies that have produced virtually all of Serbia's politicians and 
administrators are the Law Faculty, the Faculty of Economics, and the Faculty of 
Philosophy (with the possible addition of the Faculty of Philology and the considerably 
smaller Faculty of Political Science). While certainly neither of these can be called a 
"rent-seekers' school" and something like that is hardly conceivable, persons enrolling in 
them will be more likely go into a career that will involve the distribution rather than 
creation of wealth. On the other hand, studies at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, 
the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, the Faculty of Physics, the Faculty of 
Architecture, or the Faculty of Management and Computer Science, have a reputation 
associated more wi th entrepreneurial activities or innovation. The latter group is also 
popularly perceived as the schools that can 'get one out' - i.e. that graduating from one 
of them will help a person emigrate. 
The table below summar izes enrollment data for these faculties for the past three 
academic years. Since the number of students who enroll is often constrained by 
physical capacity of the school rather than the quality of the candidates, we also include 
the number of appl icants who have selected each school as their first choice, as this 
may be a better indication of the actual preferences of talent. Both pieces of data are 
not always avai lable. 
23 The apathy described above should not be taken to mean indifference or lack of interest in 
instances of corruption As everywhere else, scandals are widely publicized and cost politicians 
their reputations. However, an insufficient number of these affairs reach their conclusions in 
court, and the media typically discard a case once a new eye-catching event takes place. 
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2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 
Faculty Applied Enrolled Applied Enrolled Applied Enrolled 
law 1891 1470 1687 1470 1910 1800 
_Philolo£y_ 1835 1455 1975 1485 1849 1295 
Economics 1800 1200 1740 870 1843 
philosophy 1296 777 845 1230 
Management and Compu te r 
Science 1249 630 1125 630 660 
Political sc ience 796 315 315 672 500 
Electrical eng ineer ing 669 500 600 843 
Architecture 544 260 550 240 552 330 
Mechanical eng ineer ing 365 355 322 590 328 503 
Physics 65 350 200 46 200 
Four out of the f ive faculties that stereotypically represent "rent seeking" are 
simultaneously the facult ies with the largest student bodies on Belgrade University. On 
the other hand, of those that may more commonly train innovators, only the Faculty of 
Management and Computer Science falls among the popular ones. However, several 
qualifications are in order here. 
First, the number of students that apply to a given faculty may depend on the general 
perception of the l ikelihood of being accepted. Since a place at university is granted to 
those who attain a certain score based on their secondary school record and on their 
result on the entrance exam, students who had poorer grades in high school might not 
bother applying to schools that are known for very limited capacity - instead, a great 
number of them may choose Law or Economics, where they anticipate a greater passing 
Second, several of the mentioned faculties have a very large number of institutes or 
areas of study, the popularity of which may vary widely and which may distort the choice 
represented here. Such is the case with the Faculty of Philology, where the Institutes of 
English, Spanish, Italian, and German Studies, as well as World Literature, enjoy great 
popularity but have very limited capacities. Students often enroll into an institute only to 
try to transfer to another one in the course of their studies, and many drop out if they are 
unsuccessful. 
Third, the numbers for the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and the Faculty of Physics 
also indicate that they were not the students' first choice - as the number of applicants is 
considerably lower than the number of those who actually enroll, the difference between 
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the two numbers most likely reflects those who attempted to enroll elsewhere as their 
first choice. It is quest ionable how many of those candidates will eventually graduate. 
Finally, it should be clear that this is far from a scientific analysis of the allocation of 
talent in Serbia - the mere choice of faculties representing the productive sector and 
rent-seeking was made on the basis of myth and stereotype, and as such cannot be 
treated as fully accurate. However, since this rough first-order analysis seems to 
indicate a clear preference for one sector over the other, it appears useful to present it 
here as a call for further research in this direction. 
From this l imited information, it seems to be the case that students anticipate careers in 
rent seeking to be more rewarding than entrepreneurship. This raises questions as to 
the effects of the interference of corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency on 
entrepreneurship. It also raises concerns about the factual basis of the fears commonly 
expressed about j o b security, and it would be especially important to know whether such 
fears are a result of the uncertainty in the early transition (and, as such, temporary) or if 
they stem from some deeper cultural roots. 
We have seen that numerous incentives exist for talented citizens of Serbia to opt for 
occupational choices that do not yield the highest social return (indeed, they often do not 
yield the highest possible private return either, speaking in strictly pecuniary terms), 
ranging from deep-rooted cultural patters, to the legacies of decades of state socialism 
and the more recent period of economic collapse, uncertainty, and chaos, and to the 
more straightforward complications and costs related to entrepreneurship. We have also 
taken a very rough look into some of the actual choices made by the young and able in 
Serbia today, and although there is definite need for more thorough analyses in this 
respect (once more reliable data is available), the trend seems to follow the predicted 
course. 
The allocation of human capital is an additional concern for a country that is still at an 
early stage in its transit ion to market economy, reinforcing the already presented 
challenges in terms of the education and retention of human resources, and especially 
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Having begun with the assertion that the relationship between human capital and growth 
is not altogether clear, this study strove to penetrate the details of certain aspects of 
human capital relevant to a post-communist, post-conflict transition country such as 
Serbia, and to seek out those elements that may be critical for its future success. 
It drew a global picture of the role of education in the knowledge-based world of the 21st 
century and presented the ways in which European countries are dealing with some of 
its challenges. Most importantly, this refers to the emphasis on lifelong learning, quality 
assurance, the changing role of teachers, school accountability, and the vital importance 
of integration in the area of higher education. It was made clear that the reforms along 
these lines are guided by clear objectives and measurable against observable 
achievements, chiefly in the form of PISA tests. Having long held their own education 
systems as superior, post-communist Central European countries are now adopting 
some of these reforms as well, and are additionally undertaking measures to heal their 
education of the damaging effects of socialist control. While there are still areas in which 
they need improving (e.g. education equity), these countries have mainly adopted a 
modern outlook on educat ion, according to which it should serve the specific purpose of 
preparing the young for an unpredictable future in which a high level of education will 
become an unprecedented necessity. This much is still uncertain in Serbia, where 
education is currently influenced by a very mixed legacy of communism, the 
disintegration of the 1990's, and the faltering recovery of the post-2000 period. 
However, a certain amount of good will was generated in the system during the 2001-
2003 period and the reform infrastructure built over those three years has not been 
entirely dismantled. This means that although it may be challenging to gain the trust of 
stakeholders for renewed reforms, it is not impossible, and a good systemic basis for 
such moves still exists. 
Next, the study dealt with the difficulty posed by sheer numbers of skilled persons to 
bear a country's human capital. Tackling the question of the "brain drain" from 
developing to deve loped countries, it reached the conclusion that this is not a black-and-
white image. There are numerous reasons why the emigration of talented individuals 
could be beneficial to their source countries, including not only cash remittances but also 
the benefits of exposure to different educational and professional environments and the 
possible creation of "scientific diasporas" to aid sending countries' development. The 
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long-term best solut ion is "brain exchange" in the form of temporary and circular 
migration, from which all actors can benefit. While this can be difficult to achieve quickly, 
there are policy measures that can be taken to foster such exchanges. 
Looking at the brain drain from Serbia, the study concluded that its scale had indeed 
been devastating, but that economic progress and stabilization may still help the 
situation. There is a very clear need to monitor and quantify returns so that adequate 
policies can be implemented. Following 2000, several steps in the right direction have 
been taken and Serb ia does have room for utilizing the benefits of a large emigre 
population through establ ishing better diaspora links. 
Finally, the last chapter dealt with the somewhat less tangible question of human capital 
allocation. It examined the choices made by skilled individuals and the possible effects 
of these choices on the overall economic growth of a country. The greatest benefit 
would emerge f rom having the most able people to invest their talent into 
entrepreneurship, wh ich is often not the case - rather, they may turn to rent seeking 
activities if the returns on talent are greater in that sector. In Serbia, the great majority of 
people rely on the state rather than own initiative for the provision of economic welfare, 
and most value job security over any financial rewards. The extent to which this is a 
temporary effect of the transition is unclear, and so is the distribution of such views 
among the highly skil led. On the other hand, a culture of strong distaste for corruption 
exists. The actual al location of talent as well as the forces at work behind the allocation 
should be researched further. 
There is no need to explain that Serbia, as well as any other country today, exists in its 
environment and that this environment is quickly expanding to include every corner of 
the planet. Not only does it exist in it, it is dependent on it - more so given its recent 
history of violent confl ict with both its immediate neighbors and the wider international 
community, especial ly its most influential parts. Here is a country whose leaders have 
given their best to keep it away and out of global developments and this, they neither 
can nor will do any longer. The trend of greater reliance on knowledge and skill as the 
engine of growth is now truly a global one, and Serbia has no choice but to respond to it. 
The essential change that should take place is the adoption of an integrated vision and 
strategy for human development, which would include and take account of the aspects 
of development covered by this study, as well as several other relevant policy areas, 
such as healthcare and minority policy. That such a vision is now a conceivable reality 
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is already signif icant, but in order to have effective results and not deepen the existing 
wide gap between Serbia and the developed world, it needs to be carried out quickly and 
responsibly. 
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Annex 1. Selected Key Economic Indicators for Serbia 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 " 2004 2005 2005 2006 
January-June forecast 
Population total 7881.4 7738.4 7616.1 7532.8 7550.0 
GOP total, curr.prioes, CSD rrn 35-5168 703423 018231 1096402 132COGO 1570000 13100GG 
annual change in % (real) 5.2 6.1 4.5 2.4 8.8 5.8 8.1 4 5 
GDP/capita (EUR at exchange rate) 3 ! es2 1640 2016 2238 2305 
GDP/capita (EUR at PPP - mm) 4250 4530 6010 5140 5700 
Grass industrial production 
annual change in % (real) 11.4 0.1 1.8 -3.0 7.1 7.6 -Z1 2 4 
Grass agricultural production 
annual change in % (real) -12.B 18.6 -3.4 -7 2 19.5 
Construction, hours of work actually done 
annual change in % (re3l) -13.8 -7.4 10.9 5.2 
Grass fixed investment, CSD mn, nam. £0047 68785 122922 
annual change in % (real) 13.2 -4.1 -0.8 
Employment, total, th. pers., average B 2097.2 2101.7 2088.7 2041.4 2061.0 . 
annual change in % -2.6 0.2 -1.7 -1.2 0.5 
Reg. employees in industry, th pers.. avg. 704.6 648.1 805.3 562.0 588 0 537.0 
annual change in % -S.0 -8.8 -7.1 -7.8 -8.0 
IFS - unemployed, th pers , average ~ 425.8 432.7 459.8 500.3 865.4 
LF3 - unemployment rate in %, average £-€! 12.1 12.2 13.3 14.8 13.5 20 22 
Reg. unemployment rate in %,end of period SI 30.5 31.9 32.4 316 32.7 34 34 
Average gross monthly wages, CSD 7t 3798 8681 13280 16812 20555 16038 23588 
annual change in % (re3l, net) 5 5 16.6 20.9 13.8 11.1 13.9 8.2 
Consumer prices. % p a. 78.8 03.3 16.8 9.9 11.4 9.8 18.3 15 10 
Producer prices in industry. % p a. 102.8 97.7 8.8 4.8 9.1 7,3 13.4 15 10 
General govemm. budget, nat.def . % GOP 
Revenues 30.1 44.3 43.1 44.8 
Expenditures 40.7 48.0 47.3 46.2 
Deficit (-) 1 surplus (+), % GDP -1.6 -3.7 •4.2 -1.5 
Public debt in % of GOP 
Discount rate. % p a . end of period 28.3 18.4 9.5 9.0 8.5 . 8.5 8.5 
Current accountB| •352 -385 -1522 -1555 -2348 -1120 -414 -2000 -2400 
Current account in % of GDP -1.6 -3.3 -10.0 -0.2 -13.0 -11 -12 
Gross res^n'es of NE. excl. gold. EUP. mn 429.9 1138.6 2076.8 2728.2 3008.0 28757 3512.9 
Gross external debt, EUR mn 11860 12608 10788 10S58 10355 " 10036 11302 
FDI net. EUR mn »> 55 184 504 1204 777 281 688 
Exports of goods, BOP, EUR n-n " 16S9 1921 2202 2527 3133 1320 1780 3430 3980 
annual growth rate % 13.1 14.7 14.8 24.0 130 34.8 15 10 
Imports of goods, BOP, EUR mn SB> 3631 4756 5968 6315 8798 3958 3508 eooo 
99CO 
annual growth rate in % 31.0 26.3 11.0 33.0 33.8 -12.3 
2 10 
Exports of services, BOP, EUR mn 81 495 826 S80 891 1198 541 598 
annual growth rate in % 98.8 7.8 0.1 34.1 388 10.5 
Imports of services, BOP, EUR inn s ! 318 380 607 828 870 331 580 
annual growth rate tn % 12.8 88.4 4.7 38.9 43.8 49.3 
Avsrage exchange rate C3DAJSD 18.40 88.36 84.40 57.58 58.89 57.81 83.72 
CO 
Average exchange rate CSQ'EUR (ECU) 15.04 59.46 6D.68 85.05 73.00 70.30 31.38 
85 
Purchasing power parity CSOJUSD, wiiw 9.S0 17.80 21.80 24.60 28.70 
Purchasing power parity CSD/EliR, wiiw 10.90 20.20 24.40 28.30 30.70 
30/U 6 .  24.e0 28.70 
rc si  r rity O/ U , ii  .  20.20 24.40 28.30 30.70 
1) Preliminary. - 2) From 2002 according » census 2002. 2004: vww estimate. - 3) In 20DD wiiw estimate using black 
according to NAC6 and new weighting system . - 5) E n d i n g individual farmers. - 6) Frcm 
and Eurostat methodology. - 7) From 2002 including various allowances. • 8) Convened from USD.-0) Up „o 2004 «i of .erms. 
Source, wiiw Database incorporating national statistics; wiiw forecasts. 
84 
IrenaCerovic IEPSMasters Thesis 
Annex 2. Selected (Un)Employment Data 
3. Employed population by employment status and sex, October 2004 
Republic of Serbia 
Tota l 
Central Serbia 
Vojvodina All City of Belgrade 
T O T A L 
Total 2930846 2182037 633194 748809 
Self-employed 659427 504626 97014 154B01 
Employees 2059417 1489929 529919 569488 
Supporting h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s 212002 187482 6261 24519 
M e n 
Total 170885B 1255012 344823 453846 
Self-employed 496230 376516 68494 119714 
Employees 1155256 828752 275364 326505 
Supporting h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s 57372 49744 965 7626 





















Source: The Labor Force Survey, 2004. 
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4. Unemp loyed by educational attainment and sex, October 2004 
Tota l 
Republic of Serbia 
Central Serbia 
V o j v o d i n a 
AH City of Belgrade 
T O T A L 
Total 
Uneducated 
Primary school , i n c o m p l e t e d 
Primary school 
Secondary schoo l 
Higher school 
University Degree h o l d e r s : F a c u l t y , 
Academy, H igh S c h o o l 



































Primary schoo l . i ncomp le ted 
Primary school 
Secondary schoo l 
Higher school 
University Degree ho lde rs . Facu l t y , 
Academy, H igh S c h o o l 





























W o m e n 
Total 
Uneducated 




University Degree h o l d e r s : Facu l t y , 
Academy, H igh S c h o o l 
Post-graduates (MA, M S c , P h D ) 
362227 266798 68388 95429 
2931 2190 - 742 
10688 7133 953 3554 
72168 52552 11542 19616 
236171 172563 41503 63607 
20218 15911 5191 4307 
19672 16070 8820 3602 
379 379 379 
Source: The Labor Force Survey, 2004. 
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Annex 3. Summary PISA Results in Mathematics and Reading 
F l t j u r e 2-16;| * P e r c e n t a g e o f s tudents at cacli level o f prof i c iency < 
the m a t h e m a t i c s scale 
t Below Level 1 • level 1 • Level 2 Level? « Level 4 • Level 5 • Level f 
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Fltjure 6.2 • r e r c e l l U g c o f s t u d e n t s a t e a c h l e v e l o f pro f i c i ency oil the reading scale 
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Countries arc ranked In descending order of percentage of 15 -year-olds in Levels 3,4 and 5. 
Source: O E C D PISA 2 0 0 3 database, Table fx 1. 
Irena Cerovic IEPS Masters Thesis 
Annex 4. The Bologna Declaration 
Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education Convened in Bologna on the 
19th of June 1999 
The European p r o c e s s , t h a n k s to the extraordinary achievements of the last few 
years, has b e c o m e an increas ing ly concrete and relevant reality for the Union and its 
dtizens. E n l a r g e m e n t p rospec ts toge ther wi th deepening relations with other 
European c o u n t r i e s , p r o v i d e even wider dimensions to that reality. Meanwhile, we 
are wi tnessing a g r o w i n g awareness in large parts of the political and academic world 
and in publ ic o p i n i o n of t h e need to establish a more complete and far-reaching 
Europe, in pa r t i cu l a r bu i l d i ng upon and strengthening its intellectual, cultural, social 
and scientif ic a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l d imensions. 
A Europe of K n o w l e d g e is now wide ly recognised as an irreplaceable factor for social 
and human g r o w t h a n d as an indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the 
European c i t i z e n s h i p , capab le of g iv ing its cit izens the necessary competences to 
face the cha l l enges o f t h e new mi l lenn ium, together with an awareness of shared 
values and b e l o n g i n g t o a c o m m o n social and cultural space. 
The impor tance of e d u c a t i o n and educational co-operation in the development and 
strengthening o f s t a b l e , peacefu l and democrat ic societies is universally 
acknowledged as p a r a m o u n t , t he more so in view of the situation in South East 
Europe. 
The Sorbonne d e c l a r a t i o n of 25 th of May 1998, which was underpinned by these 
considerations, s t r e s s e d t h e Universi t ies ' central role in developing European cultural 
dimensions. I t e m p h a s i s e d the creat ion of the European area of higher education as 
a key way to p r o m o t e c i t izens ' mobi l i ty and employabi l i ty and the Continent s overall 
development. 
Several Eu ropean c o u n t r i e s have accepted the invitation to commit themselves to 
achieving t he o b j e c t i v e s set ou t in the declarat ion, by signing it or expressing, their 
agreement in p r i nc i p l e . T h e d i rect ion taken by several higher educ t on re orms 
launched in t h e m e a n t i m e in Europe has proved many Governments determination 
to act. 
European h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n ins t i tu t ions, for thei r part, have ^ e p t e d t h e c h a l l e n g e 
and taken up a m a i n ro le in const ruc t ing the European <area c,f higf 
in the wake o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principles laid down ,n the B o l o g n a M a g n a C h r t a 
Universitatum of 1 9 8 8 . Th is is of the highest importance, 
independence a n d a u t o n o m y ensure tha t higher e d u c a t i o n ^ Y*• ms 
continuously a d a p t t o chang ing needs, society's demands and advances in 
knowledge. 
The course has b e e n se t in t h e r ight direct ion and wi th 
achievement of g r e a t e r compa t ib i l i t y and comparabi l i ty o f t h e ^ t e m s of hign 
education n e v e r t h e l e s s requ i res cont inual momen tum in ^ e f e ^ s u r e s to 
accomplished. We n e e d t o suppor t it th rough p r o m o i n g concre t^meas 
achieve t a n g i b l e f o r w a r d s teps. The 18th June meeting saw participation oy 
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uthoritative e x p e r t s a n d scho lars f rom all our countries and provides us with very 
useful sugges t ions o n t h e in i t ia t ives to be taken. 
We must in p a r t i c u l a r look a t t h e object ive of increasing the international 
omDetitiveness of t h e European system of higher education. The vitality and 
efficiency of any c i v i l i sa t i on can be measured by the appeal that its culture has for 
other countr ies. We n e e d t o ensure tha t the European higher education system 
acquires a w o r l d - w i d e d e g r e e of a t t ract ion equal to our extraordinary cultural and 
scientific t r a d i t i o n s . 
While a f f i rm ing o u r s u p p o r t t o t he general principles laid down in the Sorbonne 
declaration w e e n g a g e in co -o rd ina t ing our policies to reach in the short term, and 
in any case 'w i t h i n t h e f i r s t decade of the third mil lennium, the following objectives, 
which we cons ide r t o be of p r i m a r y relevance in order to establish the European area 
of higher e d u c a t i o n a n d t o p r o m o t e the European system of higher education world-
wide: 
Adoption of a s y s t e m o f e a s i l y readab le and comparable degrees, also 
throuqh t he i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t he Diploma Supplement, in order to promote 
European c i t i zens e m p l o y a b i l i t y and the international competitiveness of the 
European h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n sys tem 
Adoption of a s y s t e m e s s e n t i a l l y based on t w o main cycles, undergraduate 
and graduate. Access t o t h e second cycle shall require successful complet ion.of f i rs t 
cycle s tudies l as t i ng a m i n i m u m of three years. The degree awarded after thes first 
hall a lso be r e l e v a n t to t he European labour market as an 
qualification. T h e s e c o n d cyc le should lead to the master and/or doctorate degree 
in many Eu ropean c o u n t r i e s . 
Establ ishment o f a s y s t e m of c red i ts - such as in the E C T S ^ ; 
means of p r o m o t i n g t h e m o s t w idespread student 
acquired in n o n - h i g h e r educa t i on contexts, including lifelong learning, provided tney 
are recognised by r e c e i v i n g Universi t ies concerned. 
Promotion o f m o b i l i t y by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free 
movement w i t h p a r t i c u l a r a t t en t i on to : 
. fo r s t u d e n t s , access to s tudy and t ra in ing opportunit ies and to related 
serv ices . . . f f r p r o a n i t i o n and valorisation 
. fo r t e a c h e r s , resea rche rs and a d m ' n ' f / ^ and training, 
of pe r iods s p e n t in a European context researching, y 
w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g the i r s ta tu tory r ights. 
Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance with a view to 
developing c o m p a r a b l e c r i te r ia and methodologies. 
Promotion o f t h e n e c e s s a r y European ^ ' ° J-" ^sdtut i o na "cq3 ope rati o n, 
particularly w i t h r e g a r d s t o curr icu lar development m research, 
mobility s c h e m e s a n d i n t e g r a t e d programmes of study, training 
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hereby u n d e r t a k e t o a t t a i n these object ives - within the framework of our 
• t itutional c o m p e t e n c e s a n d tak ing full respect of the diversity of cultures, 
I nauaqes n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n sys tems and of University autonomy - to consolidate 
the European a rea o f h i g h e r educat ion. To that end, we will pursue the ways of 
. terqcivernmental c o - o p e r a t i o n , together wi th those of non governmental European 
orqanisations w i t h c o m p e t e n c e on higher education. We expect Universities again to 
respond p r o m p t l y a n d pos i t i ve ly and to contr ibute actively to the success of our 
endeavour. 
Convinced t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the European area of higher education requires 
constant s u p p o r t , s u p e r v i s i o n and adaptat ion to the continuously evolving needs, we 
decide to m e e t a g a i n w i t h i n t w o years in order to assess the progress achieved and 
the new s teps t o be t a k e n . 
Signatories: 
Caspar EINEM, Minister of Science and Transport (Austria) 
jan ADE, Director General, Ministry of the Flemish Community, Department of Education 
(Belgium) 
Gerard SCHMIT, Director General of French Community, Ministry for Higher Education and 
Research (Belgium) 
Eduard ZEMAN, Minister of Education, Youth and Sport (Czech Republic) 
Anna Mmia TOTOMANOVA, Vice Minister of Education and Science (Bulgaria) 
Tonis LUKAS, Minister of Education (Estonia) 
Margrethe VESTAGER, Minister of Education (Denmark) 
Claude ALLEGRE, Minister of National Education, Research and Technology (France) 
Matja RASK, Minister of Education and Science (Finland) 
Ute ERDSIEK-RAVE, Minister of Education, 
Scheswig-Holstein (Permanent Conference of the Ministers 
n t-arv state Secretary, Federal Ministry of Education and 
Wolf-Michael CATENHUSEN, Parliamentary State becrew.y, 
Research (Germany) 
Adam KISS, Deputy State Secretary for Higher Education and Science (Hungary) 
Gherassimos ARSENIS, Minister of Public Education and Religious Affairs (Greece) 
Pat DOWLING, Principal Officer Ministry for Education and Science (Ireland) 
• rpnpral Ministry of Education, Science and Culture 
Gudridur SIGURDARDOTTIR, Secretary General, Ministry 
(Iceland) 
Tatiana KOKEK, State Minister of Higher Education and Science (Latvia) 
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Ortensio ZECCHINO, Minister of University and Scientific And Technological Research (Italy) 
Erna HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES, Minister of National Education and Vocational Training 
(Luxembourg) 
Kornelijus PLATE LIS, Minister of Education and Science (Lithuania) 
Loek HERMANS, Minister of Education, Culture and Science (the Netherlands) 
L o u i s GALEA, Minister of Education (Malta) 
Wilibald WINKLER, Under Secretary of State of National Education (Poland) 
Jon LILLETUN, Minister of Education, Research and Church Affairs (Norway) 
Andrei MARGA, Minister of National Education (Romania) 
Eduardo Margal GRILO, Minister of Education (Portugal) 
Pavel ZGAGA, State Secretary for Higher Education (Slovenia) 
Milan FTACNIK, Minister of Education (Slovak Republic) 
Agneta BLADH, State Secretary for Education and Science (Sweden) 
D.Jorge FERNANDEZ DIAZ, Secretary of State of Education, Universities, Research and 
Development (Spain) 
Baroness Tessa BLACKSTONE of Stoke Newington, Minister of State for Education and 
Employment (United K ingdom) 
Charles KLEIBER, State Secretary for Science and Research (Swiss Confederation) 
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Annex 5. Doing Business in Serbia 
Ease of... Economy 
Doing Business 92 
Starting a Business 35 
Dealing with Licenses 130 
Hiring and Firing 61 
Registering Property 103 
Getting Credit 99 
protecting Investors 45 
Paying Taxes 74 
Trading Across Borders 123 
Enforcing Contracts 110 
Closing a Business 90 
Best performer Worst Performer 
New Zealand Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Canada Angola 
Palau Tanzania 
Palau Burkina Faso 
New Zealand Nigeria 
United kingdom Cambodia 




Japan West Bank and Gaza 
Starting a Business ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The challenges of launching a business in Serbia and Montenegro are shown below. 
Entrepreneurs can expect to go through 10 steps to launch a business over 15 days on 
average, at a cost equal to 6 . 0 % of gross national income (GNI) per capita. They must 
deposit at least 9 . 5 % of GNI per capita in a bank to obtain a business registration number. 
Indicator Serbia and Montenegro Region 0ECD 
Procedures (number) 1 0 9 , 7 
_, , , , 15 36.5 19.5 Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 6 ' ° 1 3 , 5 
Min. capital (% of income per capita) 9 ' 5 4 9 , 1 4 1 , 0 
Dealing wi th Licenses ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The steps, t ime, and costs of complying with licensing and permitrequirementsfor ongoing 
operations in Serbia and Montenegro are shown below. It takes 21 steps and 212 days to 
complete the process, and costs 2 , 1 9 5 . 0 % of income per capita. 
I n d i c a t o r Serbia and Montenegro Region 0ECD 
21 21.4 14.1 
Procedures (number) 
212 251.8 146.9 
Time (days) 
2 195.0 668.9 75.1 
Cost (% of income per capita) ' 
Hiring & Firing W o r k e r s ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The difficulties that employers in Serbia and Montenegro face in hiring 
shown below. Each index assigns values between 0 and 100, i j i th h g h e r vaues rep 9 
more rigid regulations. The Rigidity of Employment Index is an average ot 
For Serbia and Montenegro, the overall index is 28. 
indicator S e r b i a and Montenegro Region OECD 
44 34.5 30.1 
Difficulty of Hiring Index n c n , 0 56.9 
Rigidity of Hours Index „„ r ,, 
40 41.5 Z/.4 
Difficulty of Firing Index 
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Rigidity of Employment Index 28 44.3 36.1 
Hiring cost (% of salary) 25.0 29.6 20.7 
Firing costs (weeks of wages) 21.2 32.8 35.1 
Registering Property ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The ease wi th which businesses can secure rights to 
and Montenegro, it takes 6 steps and 111 days to 
property there is 5 . 3 % of overall property value. 
property is measured below. In Serbia 
register property. The cost to register 
Indicator Serbia and Montenegro Region OECD 
Procedures (number) 6 6.5 4.7 
Time (days) 111 127.1 32.2 
Cost (% of property value) 5.3 3.0 4.8 
Getting Credit ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
Measures on credit information sharing and the legal rights of borrowers and lenders in Serbia 
and Montenegro are shown below. The Legal Rights Index ranges from 0-10, with higher 
scores indicating that those laws are better designed to expand access to credit. The Credit 
Information Index measures the scope, access and guality of credit information available 
through public registries or private bureaus. I t ranges from 0-6, with higher values indicating 
that more credit information is available from a public registry or private bureau. 
Indicator 
Legal Rights Index 
Credit In format ion Index 
Public registry coverage (% adults) 
Private bureau coverage (% adults) 













Protecting Inves tors ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The indicators below describe three dimensions of investor protection, transparency of 
transactions (Extent of Disclosure Index), liability for self-dealing (Extent of Director Liability 
Index), sha reho lde rs^™ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct (Ease of 
Shareholder Suits Index) and Strength of Investor Protection Index The indexes vary between 
0 and 10, with higher values indicating greater disclosure, greater liability of directors, greater 
powers of shareholders to challenge the transaction, and better investor protection. 
Serbia and Montenegro Region OECD 
7 4.5 6.1 
6 4.3 5.1 
4 5.6 6.6 
5.7 4.8 5.9 
Indicator 
Disclosure Index 
Director Liability Index 
Shareholder Suits Index 
Investor Protection Index 
Paying Taxes ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The effective tax that a medium size company i 
within a year is shown below. Entrepreneurs 
hours, and pay 4 6 . 3 % of gross profit in taxes. 
i Serbia and Montenegro must pay or withhold 
there must make 41 payments, spend 168 
94 




Total tax payable ( % gross profit) 










Trading Across Borders ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The costs and procedures involved in importing and exporting a standardized shipment of 
goods in Serbia and Montenegro are detailed under this topic. Every official procedure involved 
is recorded - start ing from the final contractual agreement between the two parties, and 
ending with the del ivery of the goods. 






















Documents for export (number) 
Signatures for export (number) 
Time for export (days) 
Documents for impor t (number) 
Signatures for impor t (number) 
Time for import (days) 
Enforcing Contracts ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The ease or dif f iculty of enforcing commercial contracts in Serbia and Montenegro is measured 
below. It takes 33 steps and 635 days to enforce contracts there. The cost of enforcing 
contracts is 18.1% of debt. 
Serbia and Montenegro Region OECD 
33 17-4 





Cost (% of debt) 
Closing a Business ( 2 0 0 5 ) 
The t ime and cost required to resolve bankruptcies is shown * S - J J , 
the process takes 2 .7 years - d costs 2 3 % »,«he - « ^ J J ^ K S - J K u . . 
in terms of how many cents on the dollar claimants recuvei ..u 
Indicator 
Time (years) 
Cost (% of estate) 
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
Serbia and Montenegro Region OECD 
2.7 3.5 1.5 
23 14.0 7.4 
20.3 29.8 73.8 
